Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
The Cresset (archived issues)
4-1987

The Cresset (Vol. L, No. 6)
Valparaiso University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The Cresset (archived issues) by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please
contact a ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

• Rellettions on Edm.und Burke and Moral Realism
• The Seduction of Silence, Or, the Deaty•s Progress
• Whw the Court Is Wrong about Affirmative Action
~

I

....
..... ....·...··.·:··...··.... ......
.·.:·........
...
·....
..::···:
:·::.
:··
...
=······
......
.::·.::::.
. . :··:
.
.:·.. ···:
.. .. ..... .. ...:....
........
.
.
·····
.....·......
.
:-·.:·.::-~:::::.:

:~-·

CRESSET

Va lparaiso University
Valpara iso, Indiana 46383

APRIL, 1987 Vol. L, No. 6
ISSN 0011-1198

ROBERT V. SCHNABEL, Publisher
JAMES NUECHTERLEIN, Editor

Contributors
3 The Editor I IN LUCE TUA
6 James Nuechterlein I EDMUND BURKE AND MORAL REALISM
11 Kim Bridgford I APPLES (Verse)
12 Megan Wolfe I THE SEDUCTION OF SILENCE
17 William Bein I SENSATION OF FLIGHT (Verse)
18 Alan Graebner I CATALOGING OUR TIMES
19 Gary Fincke I THE DEATH INDEX (Verse)
20 Walter McDonald I LEVELS (Verse)
21 Charles Vandersee I MOEBIE ON MALLS
23 ]. T. Ledbetter I STILL THERE (Verse)
24 Gail McGrew Eifrig I NATIONAL HOLIDAYS
25 Gary Fincke I CROSSING THE HIGHWAY (Verse)
25 Linda Ferguson I NOT QUITE AT HOME IN INDIANA
29 ]. T. Ledbetter I THE PEOPLE IN THE NEXT ROOM (Verse)
30 Jill Baumgaertner I A NEW VOICE FROM IRELAND
31 Gary Fincke I THE WHITE CELL COUNT FEAR (Verse)
32 Dot Nuechterlein I "NEAR-POORNESS"

1

Departmental Editors
Jill Baumgaertner,

Poetry Editor
W. ·~auer, Art Editor
D~~~i.tiirm;;;ill<_i: t;opy Editor

Richard

.·..·....

H~

:
.:·.f\Civisory Board
t

•

....·... .
·

::·.
•

••

::·:~· J"-.1!1~~ 1\}~e~s: .•: : :.~r~erK:k Niedner
• • • • R~~P,:~~pit;r: .. ::·W l Pi~ hi
:::• J;meys CaJ"is.ti ••••• • .Mar(S~hwehn

.·.·.:... . ..
.·.
.· ...
· :·.~~iness Mana!{~·::::
..
. . ..
\-V'ilQt4- H. Hutchi~\' Pi:Wnce

~·: -.. Alf~ ;r,l-~i€t:: .: ::: :Sue :\Yienhorst

Betty "wagner, Administration and Circulation
THE CRESSET is published monthly during the academic year,
September through May, by the Valparaiso University Press as a
forum for ideas and informed opinion. The views expressed are
those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of opinion at Valparaiso University. Manuscripts should be
addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return postage. Letters to the Editor for publication are subject to editing for brevity. T he Book Review Index and the American Humanities Index list
Cresset reviews. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana.
Regular subscription rates: one year-$8.50; two years-$14.75;
single copy-$1.25. Student subscription rates: one year-$4.00;
single copy-$. 75. Entire qmtents copyrighted 1987 by the Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383, without
whose written permission reproduction in whole or in part for
any purpose whatsoever is expressly forbidden.

2

Cover and above (detail): Doris Zakian (VU '80),
American contemporary, Jonah II, 1985, lithograph,
12 x 16 inches.
This print is on exhibit this spring in the Valparaiso
University Union as part of Doris Zakian's solo
show there of paintings and prints on Biblical
themes.
RHWB
The Cresset

IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Affirmative Discrimination
Someone has remarked that Americans are the only
people in the world who would follow pragmatism
right off the edge of a cliff. That comment comes inevitably to mind as one contemplates the Supreme
Court's most recent decision on affirmative action and
much of the early reaction to that decision. The Court
has in effect ruled-and its defenders have praised it
for so doing-that in pursuit of a desirable public policy it is permissible to ignore the clear meaning and intent of a major law and in the process to violate a fundamental principle that until recently has been at the
very heart of what America as a society is all about.
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency the Court decided
that the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County, California, had the right to promote Diane
Joyce to the position of road dispatcher over Paul
Johnson, even though Johnson had been rated by a
promotion board as more qualified. The Transportation Agency had initiated an affirmative action program to place women and minorities in positions in
which they had been substantially underrepresented.
No prior record of discrimination had been claimed
against the agency. It simply promoted Joyce over
Johnson because it wanted more women in particular
jobs. In other words, Joyce received the promotion because she is a woman; Johnson did not because he is
a (white) male. Had the two been of the same gender
(and race), Johnson, not Joyce, would have got the job.
The Court has therefore decreed thatemployers can
discriminate against white men in order to improve
the employment situations of women and minorities,
even in situations where women and minorities have
not themselves been victims of discrimination. In pursuit of a work force "balanced" according to race and
gender, the rights of individuals outside the groups
targeted for preference can be ignored. From the perspective of American history and tradition-not to
mention that of simple justice-this is an altogether
extraordinary development.
In arriving at its decision, the Court had to get
around the awkward presence of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which flatly prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race and gender.
About the intent of that statute there can be no legitimate dispute: faced with the charge that the law might
April, 1987

lead to special preferences for women and minorities,
its advocates unreservedly indicated that the words
employed meant precisely what they said-no discrimination, either in favor of particular groups or against
them.
Justice Antonin Scalia's eloquent dissent tells the
simple truth: "The Court today completes the process
of converting [the Civil Rights Act] from a guarantee
that race or sex will not be the basis for employment
determinations to a guarantee that it often will. We effectively replace the goal of a discrimination-free society with the quite incompatible goal of proportionate
representation by race and by sex in the workplace."
We have heard much in recent years of the rise of the
imperial judiciary. That charge has regularly been dismissed as an exercise in hyperbole. In light of decisions like this, one wonders how.
Defenders of the Court have indicated a blithe disregard for the law in question and for the non-discrimination principle behind it. They have instead appealed to the "pragmatic" factors noted at the outset,
the implicit point being that where a good cause is involved, neither law nor principle should unduly concern us. Here truly is pragmatism run amuck.
The practical considerations referred to by the ·
Court and/or its defenders are several: a) the affirmative-action program in question was voluntary, and the
courts should therefore keep their hands off; b) the
difference in qualifications between the candidates was
marginal, so the degree of discrimination involved was
correspondingly insignificant; c) the Civil Rights Act
was aimed at malign bias, while affirmative-action programs have benevolent ends; d) the policy in question
was moderate and flexible and did not involve rigid
quotas or permanent systems of preference; e) any
consistent policy of race-and-gender blindness will
make it impossible for employers to achieve the surelydesirable end of a more diversified work force; f)
given the long history of blatant discrimination against
women and blacks, it requires notably poor grace for
white males to complain when the shoe is placed, especially in so mild and provisional a manner, on the
other foot.
One hardly knows where to begin in reply. Perhaps
the simplest way is to take the points in order.
Those who see the affirmative-action plan as "voluntary" should consult Mr. Johnson. He never agreed to
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let the Transportation Agency take his rights away in
this or any other manner. It is an essential role of the
courts to protect the rights of individuals over against
powerful groups, including private employers. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 precisely forbids the kind of
discrimination that his employer "volunteered" on behalf of Paul Johnson.
It is true that the difference in qualifications between Mr. Johnson and Ms. Joyce was not great, but
that is irrelevant to the principle under consideration.
Imagine the situation in reverse. Would Ms. joyce (or
anyone else) agree that it's all right to discriminate in
favor of men and whites against women and blacks so
long as the degree of discrimination is relatively mild?
Furthermore, there is nothing in this decision that
would necessarily forbid very severe forms of discrimination. After all, if the end is to be desired

It is not the purpose of the law to
extract revenge for the injustices of
yesterday; it is to establish justice
today. The past is irretrievable.
The argument that affirmative-action discrimination
can be justified because it has benign rather than nasty
purposes is similarly irrelevant. The Congress in 1964
did not set out to create a diversified work force in
America. It intended merely to end discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.
That's all. If today's Congress or court system wants to
go beyond that, let Congress pass a law and the courts
test its constitutionality. It is not for the courts to rewrite existing legislation in terms of ends that are
beyond statute law but that the courts believe ought to
be achieved. It is for the American people acting
through their elected representatives to define the
ends they want the laws to achieve (consistent with
constitutional limitations). Usurpation by the courts for
subjectively-determined benign ends remains usurpation.
The "moderate and flexible" argument is a diversionary dodge. The Congress intended that discrimination
by race or gender should not be tolerated under the
law. It did not qualify that judgment to allow for
"moderate and flexible" exceptions. During the 1960s,
Southerners came up with all sorts of moderate and
flexible variations on their Jim Crow laws. The courts
saw through those ; they ought to see through these.
It is puzzling to imagine on what grounds defenders
of affirmative-action privilege argue that without such
privilege a more diversified work force cannot be
achieved. If the laws forbidding discrimination against
4

women and minonues are stringently enforced-as
they most assuredly should be-why should whatever
natural work-force balance that individual effort and
the needs of the market decree not eventuate?
There is no way of knowing in advance what is the
"proper" proportion of women or minorities in any
given occupation. The way to find out is to guarantee
by law a non-discriminatory field of opportunity and
then let the normal forces of ambition, effort, and talent take their course. Diversity is to be desired, but
what plausible common interest is served by defining
its precise (or even general) pattern in advance and
then securing conformity to that pattern by means of
depriving particular individuals of their rights? Surely
defenders of minority and women's rights do not
mean to suggest that the people for whom they speak
cannot, even when guaranteed equal protection of the
laws, compete favorably with white males.
No one could reasonably deny that whatever discriminations are visited upon white men by affirmative-action programs today pale into insignificance
compared with the outrages imposed upon women
and minorities in the past. But it is not the purpose
of the law to extract revenge for. the injustices of yesterday; it is rather to establish justice today. The past
is irretrievable. We can't offer restitution to those who
suffered discrimination in years gone by, and justice is
not served by offsetting a set of discriminatory practices against specific individuals in the past with a new
set of discriminatory practices against different individuals in the present. Restitution is rightly owed only
to specific victims of specific injustices; no individual,
simply by virtue of being a member of a group whose
ancestors endured evil yesterday, can legitimately
make claim to special privileges today.
The matter at issue goes beyond a particular question of public policy. It goes to the very heart of what
our society stands for. From the very beginning, the
sense of American distinctiveness was rooted in the
idea that here above all people were to be recognized
and rewarded not according to prescriptive status but
according to achieved merit. The American Dream
promised that all individuals had access to the good
things in life without regard to barriers or benefits of
race, religion, ethnicity, or other arbitrary accidents of
birth.
That creed was often violated, and only in relatively
recent times has it come to take seriously into account
matters of gender. Affirmative-action policies need not
violate the creed if they act simply to make more inclusive than before the offer to the American people
to participate on equal legal footing in the remarkable
opportunities this society, for all its lingering faults,
still holds open to them.
The Cresset

But if affirmative action comes to be defined in
terms of group rights and obligations, then it will have
turned itself into an alien intrusion in our national
life. It is not what we are about, and it should not be
allowed to become so. If it does, we will have become
something other than what we have always been. That
should not occur at all; it certainly should not occur
in a fit of absence of mind. Let's this time resist the
temptation to follow pragmatism over a cliff.
Cl

they have a prevailing adversary stance to political authority that we think misplaced.) They deserve to receive the resources necessary to fulfill their tasks competently.
But there is no reason to believe that for the Dan
Rathers of the world to be able to do their job properly we have to take them at their own often exaggerated estimation.
Cl

The Underestimation of Ronald Reagan
Crisis at Black Rock?
CBS News has long been noted for three things: its
generally high level of competence, its mildly left-ofcenter bias, and its comfortable air of smugness about
how well it does its job.
But now the network news division for which Edward R. Murrow is patron saint (he only displayed the
first two of the prevailing characteristics) has come
upon lean days. The budget for CBS News has been
cut by some ten per cent (out of $300 million) , and the
outcry over the cuts-not least from within the network itself-would lead one to think that western
civilization as we have known it is under immediate
threat. The accountants and the barbarians, so we are
told, are at the gates; a sacred public trust is at stake.
A bit of perspective may be in order. The budget
for CBS News has grown some 250 per cent in less
than a decade, a figure wildly in excess of the rate of
inflation. After the projected cuts in staff have been
imposed, CBS will retain roughly the same number of
reporters and correspondents as ABC and NBC. Many
of those within the organization concede the presence
of fat within existing budgets; salaries and perks for
network stars have reached extraordinary levels. Who
really believes that the closing of news bureaus in Warsaw, Bangkok, and Seattle will endanger the quality
and integrity of the news product?
And all that talk of news as a "public trust" should
receive careful scrutiny. Things in the public trust
have public accountability, and the critics of the cutbacks within CBS News who invoke such language
might want to think twice about the implications of
their rhetoric. After CBS announced its cuts, two
Democratic members of the House subcommittee on
telecommunications called for hearings on whether
those reductions were in the public interest. One wonders if the dissidents within CBS News really want to
pursue the implications that line of inquiry suggests.
We intend no exercise in populist network-baiting
here. By and large, our national news organizations do
a competent-sometimes even admirable-job. (Though
April, 1987

One would think that Ronald Reagan's critics would
have learned by now. Throughout his political career,
he has been singularly blessed by his opponents' apparently unalterable tendency to underestimate him. They
cannot think of him as other than a lightweight, and
the fact that he has so regularly confounded their contempt makes no discernible difference in their attitude
towards him, or in their continuing certainty that this
time, surely, he will reap the disaster his incompetence
has decreed him. Reagan is no candidate for Mensa,
but his political intelligence has in fact always far exceeded those for whom his enduring popularity remains an unfathomable mystery.
In 1980, the critics wondered how such an ill-informed candidate could possibly compete in direct engagement with such a master of detail as Jimmy Carter. In 1984, after Reagan stumbled in an early debate
against Walter Mondale, they portrayed him as headed
for disaster in the next encounter. In 1987, after the
Iragua disclosures of a disengaged chief executive,
they indicated their disbelief that a President so removed from the specifics of policy could withstand the
give-and-take of an unstructured press conference.
Yet, in each of these cases, Reagan has by general
consent emerged as a clear success. And each time, no
small measure of that success has come from the extraordinarily low standards of expectation constructed
for him by his critics. Predicted by those who disdain
him as certain to make a fool of himself, Reagan has
on each occasion earned easy victory simply by virtue
of demonstrating that he is not the village idiot. With
such enemies, he hardly needs friends.
The Iragua affair has not yet concluded, and there
may yet emerge revelations that damage the President
substantially. But those who confidently anticipate his
political demise would do well to remind themselves
that this is the most successful American President
since Franklin Roosevelt, and that his success is by no
means simply a matter of dumb luck. Only those
blinded by ideological antipathy could imagine otherWISe.

••
••
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James Nuechterlein

EDMUND BURKE AND MORAL REALISM
An Introduction to Reflections on the Revolution in France

(Editor's Note: This essay was originally presented this February to the Freshman Pro[Jram in Christ College, the Honors College at Valparaiso University.)

One of the questions college students ask-or ought
to ask-when assigned a new author or a new text is,
"Why should we study this stuff?" Professors, like parents with small children, are often tempted to respond, "Because I said so," or, if they are in a more
tolerant (or more insidious) mood, "Because it's good
for you." Collegians and small children alike probably
deserve better answers.
In the case of Edmund Burke, it is easy to give good
answers. Burke is a major figure in the intellectual history of the French Revolution, and that is important
to us because modern ideological politics-the politics
of Left and Right, of radical/liberal/conservative/reactionary-is generally considered to have originated in
the Revolution and in reactions to it. It remains a commonplace that one's reaction to the French Revolution
offers a good litmus test of one's ideological instincts
and preferences.
Burke, who of course opposed the Revolutionmore particularly, the spirit behind it-is generally
acknowledged as the founder of modern conservatism,
and the text you are currently considering, his Reflections on the Revolution in France, stands as a classic statement of conservative philosophy. Those who think of
themselves as conservatives, or who simply wish to understand conservatism, have to come to terms with
Burke in the same way that radicals or students of
radicalism have to come to terms with Marx.
Coming to terms with Burke is not all that easy in
an American context. In a society dominated as no
other by the liberal tradition, Burke cannot be seen as

James Nuechterlein is Associate Professor of American
Studies and Political Science at Valparaiso University and
Editor of The Cresset.
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other than alien. Even American conservatives (and
there are currently lots of them around) appear more
properly defined as old-fashioned liberals, i.e., champions of individual freedom, property rights, and limited government. As has often been noted, American
politics seems best understood as a clash of differing
forms of liberalism.

America has never been a fertile
ground for those of conservative
temperament, and conservatism has
never been the mainstream of the
American political tradition.
From the perspective of modern democratic
liberalism, Burke in 1789 took the losing side. Certainly many of Burke's particular causes at the time
would be uncongenial to Americans today, even to
American conservatives. Only whimsical eccentrics
would care to defend institutions of the monarchy, an
established church, or a hereditary aristocracy established politically in a House of Lords. In addition to
those institutional attachments, who in America would
be eager to uphold Burkean principles of hierarchy,
skepticism toward rapid social mobility, organicism, or
the sanctity of tradition?
And beyond either institutions or values, there is the
question of mood. Whether in the Reflections or in the
tradition in general, conservatism is perhaps most
broadly defined in its skeptical attitude toward change,
yet Americans, as has often been remarked, not only
welcome change but rush out to embrace it. Because
of their basic trust that human nature is, if not benign,
at least infinitely malleable and that social problems
are readily soluble by applications of rationality and
good will, Americans typically affirm that most fundamental of liberal assumptions: change is good.
America has never been a fertile ground for those
of conservative temperament, and conservatism has
The Cresset

never been the mainstream of the American political
tradition. George Santayana said it all when he expressed pity for any conservative unlucky enough to
have been born an American. The abiding irony of
American conservatism consists in this: conservatives
appeal to tradition, and in America the tradition to be
conserved is liberal.
Yet perhaps some of that irony dissolves in the perspective of recent American history. Many Americans
labeled today as conservatives or neo-conservatives see
themselves as defenders of the classical American liberal tradition against the perversions of the collectivist
liberalism of the contemporary era, and in preserving
that tradition they may be seen as exercising an essential conservative function.

Conservatives in any society ought
to be about the preserving of the
best of their own tradition, and the
traditions to be preserved will not
everywhere be the same. What is
best for one society is not
necessarily so for another.
Burke understood that there is no one body of conservative thought, that political ideas, institutions, and
values vary according to time and circumstances. His
own conservatism was always pragmatic and adaptable,
based on certain general and universal moral principles but not on a specific body of doctrine. Conservatives in any society ought to be about the preserving of
the best of their own tradition, and the traditions to
be preserved will not everywhere be the same. What is
best for one society is not necessarily so for another.
Thus the idea of a conservative defense of a liberal
tradition is not such an oddity as it might at first seem.
It is also useful, in this context, to look at the American condition from an international perspective. In
many ways, America is today a conservative, status quo
power. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. was widely perceived as a revolutionary
society; our principles of liberal democracy were the
revolutionary principles of the era. America in its early
days seemed the hope, even the embodiment, of the
Left.
All that has changed in the course of the twentieth
century. Marxian socialism is the revolution of this
century, and our system of bourgeois democracy is the
ancien regime against which that revolution is directed.
Our values of democratic capitalism are now commonly seen as conservative on the world scene;
April, 1987

America is today portrayed as the enemy by the international Left.
In that perspective, Burke takes on a new relevance.
Much of the spirit-not the specific politics but the
spirit-of his opposition to the radicalism of the
French revolutionaries can easily be adapted to
America's current ideological conflict with revolutionary socialism. Burke once said that his whole politics
was centered in anti-Jacobinism: opposition to the radical ideology behind the French Revolution. One can
plausibly make the case that behind the radicalisms of
both the eighteenth and twentieth centuries stand
what Burke would have understood as common utopian fantasies, shared pernicious illusions concerning
human and political possibilities that have resulted in
the terrible excesses of both revolutionary movements.
Historians have long noted that the origins of the
totalitarian imagination of our time can be located in
certain tendencies of the French revolutionary spirit.
One finds in their and in our revolutionaries a common denial of that most central of conservative values,
a sense of humility before God and history. It may
well be, therefore, that Burke's counter-revolutionary
spmt has significant impulses to contribute to
America's current anti-revolutionary situation.
But if we are to talk reasonably about Burke's relevance, we need rather more specificity. We need at
least a basic outline of what it is that constitutes Burkean conservatism.*
II

Burke was not a systematic political philosopher. He
was rather a political actor whose major political writings-the Reflections included-were responses to particular events and situations. It is significant to note
that Burke could not be categorized as a conservative
during most of his political career; he belonged to the
Whig faction in British politics, not the Tory. He became noted as a defender of the American cause in
the colonists' quarrels with England during the 1760s
and '70s, and his urging in Parliament of conciliation
and of granting of wide autonomy to the colonies
made him a hero in America, at least until the publication of the Reflections in 1790.
*The discussion in Section II of this essay relies substantially on the excellent chapter on Burke in William T.
Bluhm, Theories of the Political System (1st ed., 1965). I also
wish to note here that my sense of Burke's relevance for
our time was first awakened by Alexander M. Bickel's perceptive essay on Burke in the New Republic (March 17,
1973). Finally, I have benefited from quarreling with
Conor Cruise O'Brien's stimulating but, in my view, often
wrong-headed introduction to the Penguin edition of the
Reflections (1969).
7

Burke's ties to conservatism developed late in his
career from his reaction to the events in France in
1789 and afterward , particularly to the radical utopian
theories that he saw behind the Revolution . From the
beginning, Burke's primary concern was not France
but England. The widespread approval given the Revolution in certain circles of English society aroused in
him great fear of the spread of revolutionary principles across the Channel. He wanted desperately to
quarantine the revolutionary virus. When the Whig
leader Charles James Fox praised the Revolution in
Parliament, Burke publicly broke with him and the
party and was banished to the political wilderness. He
retired from Parliament in 1794.

One can't approach politics, Burke
insisted, as an exercise in applied
moral imperatives. Given the variety
of social goods to be pursued,
politics involves the weaving together
of these goods and the values
behind them in particular cases.
The Reflections, as noted , is not a work of formal
political theory. Indeed, Burke throughout his career
exhibited a deep distrust of abstract political theory,
and that distrust is reflected throughout the pages of
the Reflections. Yet if Burke never worked out a comprehensive political philosophy, it is possible to draw
out certain general and fundamental ideas from the
Reflections that do together constitute a coherent, if
highly generalized, set of political principles.
When Burke castigated "men of theory" for their
taste for "metaphysical abstraction ," he had in mind
the dominant deductive political theory of his time.
The rationalistic political thought of the French
philosophes and men like them elsewhere struck Burke
as arid and detached from reality. In Aristotelian
terms, he preferred that political thought free itself
from the abstractions of the speculative reason and
focus instead on the specificities of the practical
reason. For Burke, insistence on and deduction from
abstract principles in politics-as in insistence on the
"rights of man"-tended to be misleading and dangerous. There were certain fundamental and absolute
constants of human existence that had to be recognized and attended to, but these had more to do with
personal moral behavior than with political policy.
The real world of politics always involved infinite
modifications and endless possible combinations. A
system of political thought preoccupied with logical
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connections between general principles failed for
Burke because it characteristically ignored the particular empirical circumstances that give politics its true
center.
I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to
any thing which relates to human actions and human
concerns on a simple view of the object, as it stands
stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which
with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to
every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render
every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to
mankind.
Burke objected in particular to the contemporary
emphasis on individual freedom as the great central
good of politics. Too much of the constitutional system-building of the time, he thought, focused on that
(undeniable) virtue to the virtual exclusion of other
political goods. Politics rightly conceived has to do with
the general good, and the complex and variegated nature of society therefore decrees that the general good
must necessarily be complex and variegated as well.
One can't approach politics, Burke insisted, as an
exercise in applied moral imperatives. Given the variety of social goods to be pursued, politics involves the
weaving together of these goods and the values behind
them in particular cases, attempting always to arrive at
specific optimal combinations. This synthesizing process is an art, not a precise science. The political rights
of man , Burke insisted, exist not in a pure abstract
form, but in a sort of middle ground, "incapable of
[precise] definition, but not impossible to be discerned." Political reason, Burke says in perhaps his
most crucial passage, "is a computing principle: adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally
and not metaphysically or mathematically, true moral
denominations."
Politics consists in compromises between good and
evil, between evil and evil, and between "differences of
good." The point is not simply that we can often hope
to achieve only the relatively better or the lesser evil;
the more profound insight is that politics involves
trade-offs between competing goods.
Here Burke suggests the key doctrine of moral incommensurability in political life. The plural political
ends we seek exist in genuine tension with each other.
We pursue but cannot fully realize at once authority
and liberty, freedom and equality, individualism and
community. A Rousseau, as in his idea of the General
Will, wants to maximize all good things all at once.
Burke knows that it cannot be so. He knows further
that the statesman has available to him only the intimations of prudence in working his synthesizing art;
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he can rely on no abstract rule of reason to guide him.
Even if there were such a rule, Burke suggests, any
given individual would run up against the limits of any
one person being able to apprehend it or act comprehensively upon it. Each of us exhibits the limits and
weaknesses of reason; reason is only a part of our nature, and is not necessarily predominant. Our activities
of comprehending and acting depend fully as much
on feeling and will as on reason .

Burke is no reactionary, implacably
wedded to the past and opposed to
all change. He explicitly recognizes
the inevitability and necessity of
change: "A state without the means
of some change is without the means
of its conservation."
We have, Burke argues, natural affections, affinities,
and loyalties that transcend pure reason. As Conor
Cruise O'Brien has suggested, Burke reveals "a strong
distrust of all reasoning not inspired by affection for
what is near and dear." There is for Burke a kind of
natural pluralism to human society. We have many
levels of association and sympathy short of the political, and the larger the sphere of activity, the less
closely are we bound to it.
We feel the bonds of affection and obligation most
deeply at primary levels-family, neighborhood, and
church. These are the "little platoons" that help prepare us for attachments at higher social levels; they
are in effect a training ground for them. Burke found
it unnatural that so much of the political thought of
his time leaped in its concerns all the way from the
isolated individual to the comprehensive community.
He insisted in any case that whatever the level of our
attachments, they cannot adequately be accounted for
or justified by pure reason.
If Burke's faith in individual reason is limited, his
trust in what might be called communal reason is
more encompassing. Individuals, Burke tells us, can be
foolish, as can political majorities at any given time,
but the species humankind is wise. The individual may
find wisdom if he defers to the guidance of the society
in which he lives, as that guidance has been developed
over time. Political wisdom, in other words, is to be
found most surely in history. Communal reason resides in the long-held values and institutions of a given
society, which express and embody that society's basic
beliefs, unselfconscious and habitual.
Thus Burke's notorious defense of "prejudice," by
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which he means not the sense of malign bias that we
customarily attach to it, but rather the latent wisdom
of our accumulated moral beliefs. Our prejudices, for
Burke, are our moral commonplaces, our "untaught
feelings," the ethical affirmations we absorb insensibly
in the process of acculturation. They constitute the
sifted moral wisdom of any society; indeed, he says,
"the moral sentiments [are] so nearly connected with
early prejudice as to be almost one and the same
thing."
Here one encounters in Burke the bedrock of his
conservatism, the deep dependence on tradition. Yet
he is no reactionary, implacably wedded to the past
and opposed to change. He explicitly recognizes the
inevitability and necessity of change: "A state without
the means of some change is without the means of its
conservation." But beneficial change will always be
moderate and gradual, organically related to the past,
not in arrogant disregard of it. Reform and evolution
are to be embraced, innovation and revolution presumptively to be rejected. As the modern Burkean
Michael Oakeshott has put it, it is the duty of the
statesman continously to draw out the intimations of a
tradition.
Burke harbored no doubts that traditional England
must be a more stable and contented society than revolutionary France, and he located British superiority
in an organicism consistent with the order of nature.
Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and
with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent
body composed of transitory parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, molding together the
great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the
whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or
young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy,
moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay,
fall, renovation, and progression. Thus, by preserving
the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in
what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we
retain we are never wholly obsolete.
One might, at this point, begin to suspect Burke of
a kind of political mysticism. His emphasis on prescription and prejudice can seem to imply the impossibility of any coherent political theory at all and to
suggest instead that individuals give in to political irrationalism and to a blind faith in an organic past intuitively-and certainly uncritically-accepted.
But Burke is no irrationalist, and he does not suppose that support of tradition is a sufficient political
philosophy. Politics involves choices, and we need rational principles to guide those choices. The past can
direct our preservation but not our innovation.
Burke locates his principles of rational order in clas9

sica! and Christian conceptions of natural law (which
he sharply distinguished from the contemporary doctrine of natural rights of which he was so skeptical).
There is for Burke a divine transcendent law that provides the general moral principles by which all politics
must be guided.
What is the natural law and how is it to be known?
Burke provides the same answer as did St. Thomas
Aquinas: the natural law is the law of morality implanted in our hearts by God and accessible both by
reason and by inclination. It is this natural law that
moves our prejudices beyond superstition and irrationalism; our moral instincts, it turns out, provide
the foundation of our knowledge of the law of nature.
Thus we have, Burke is sure, natural inclinations to
justice, equity, religious belief, family affection, and
hatred of injustice and cruelty.
These highly generalized moral instincts provide
only the beginning of virtue; they need to be educated
and developed into habitual practices of right behavior. This is the function that our particular social
and political institutions serve: they carry and mediate
the natural law to us, translating its general principles
into specific rubrics. This applies both in morality and
in politics. Burke abhorred the French Revolution because it relied on the pernicious abstractions of the
rights of man; he sympathized with the American colonists because they appealed quite specifically to the
rights of Englishmen.
Thus Burke returns, as always, to circumstance.
Knowledge of moral principles is itself insufficient to
statesmen. As Aquinas noted, the general precepts of
the natural law are of but limited use for public policy.
They always have to be applied or translated into
human law, and that process is characteristically uncertain and inexact, dependent on specific conditions.
Those responsible for the laws can't lose sight of principles, but they must be guided by circumstances.
For Burke, then, political morality always involves
an intimate relation of the universal and the particular. The former only takes on meaning as it makes
contact with the latter. He who would morally prescribe for political situations without intimate acquaintance with the particular conditions of the case is for
Burke "not erroneous but stark mad . . . he is
metaphysically mad."
III

There is much more that could be said concerning
the basic framework of Burke's thought, but in the
limited time still available, I want to focus on what I
take to be his most enduring legacy to us, that is, his
sense of moral realism.
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That realism consists, in the first instance, in Burke's
affirmation of the anti-utopian imperative: the insistence that we cannot remake human nature and
human society from scratch and simply according to
will or to a set of rational principles. Thus he quotes
with astonishment the innocent arrogance of the president of the new French national assembly: "All the establishments of France crown the misery of the
people: to make them happy, it is necessary to renew
them, change their ideas, change their laws, change
their manners ... change men, change things, change
words ... destroy everything; yes, destroy everything,
since everything is to be recreated." This IS the
"metaphysical madness" that Burke identifies as the
motive power of revolutionary ideology.

Burke's realism consists, in the
first instance, in his affirmation of
the anti-utopian imperative: the
insistence that we cannot remake
human nature and human society from
scratch and simply according to will
or to a set of rational principles.
For Burke, the limits of politics originate in the limits of man, both intellectual and moral. People have no
"rights" to that which is not reasonable; in proclaiming
men's rights, he reminds us, we must not forget their
natures.
Yet Burke's realism never descends to moral cynicism nor even to a pragmatic utilitarianism. It is here
that one encounters the importance of transcendent
religious principles for Burke. Religion to him provides the foundation of the moral order and of civil
society. He insisted on an establishment of religion because such establishment seemed to him essential to
preservation of the virtue of rulers and ruled alike.
Man is a naturally religious creature, and religious
faith is essential to his moral behavior.
At the same time, however, religion must not be
confused with politics; therein lies a great potential
danger. Since man is naturally religious, in religion's
absence-an absence encouraged, Burke felt, by the
atheism and infidelity of the French revolutionariesthe resulting void will be filled by some "uncouth, pernicious, and degrading supersition." The absence or
weakness of transcendent religious faith, in other
words, leaves the door open to moral and political
fanaticism. (One is reminded in this context of G.K.
Chesterton's remark that when a man loses his faith,
he will not then believe nothing, he will believe anyThe Cresset

thing.)
Throughout the Reflections, Burke indicates his disdai?. ~nd fear of "political theologians and theological
pohticians," those who mix religious principles and
political doctrines, who confuse eternal with temporal
things. (Burke observed witheringly of the politicized
divines of his time that "they have nothing of politics
but the passions they excite.") Religion is the basis of
the natural law, but it does not typically offer specific
prescriptions for politics. An acceptable politics must
not violate the principles of the natural order, but
there is only on rare occasions a direct translation
from natural to human law. Burke traced the radical
destructiveness of revolutionary ideologues to their assumption that moral/religious ideals ought directly to
b~ embodied in political practice, and their resulting
bitterness when, as must inevitably be the case, the
realities of politics do not measure up to their revolutionary dreams. Of frustrated idealists are alienated
misanthropes made: "hating vice too much, they come
to love men too little."
Thus moral realism requires of us that we not separate our moral values from our politics, but that we at
the same time be careful not to assume automatic or
direct connections between them. There are limits,
Burke insists, to our moral knowledge and performance, especially as they are related to politics. This
perception comes through brilliantly in a quotation
near the end of the Reflections, where Burke, praising
the caution, circumspection, and moral humility of the
founders of the British Constitution, compares their
behavior favorably with the arrogance of the French
revolutionaries.
Not being illuminated with the light of which the
gentlemen of France tell us they have got so abundant
~ share, they acted under a strong impression of the
Ignorance and fallibility of mankind. He that had made
them thus fallible, rewarded them for having in their
conduct attended to their nature. Let us imitate their
cau.tion, if we wish to deserve their fortune, or to retain
their bequests.
~or Burke, then, we are endlessly driven back in politics to the computing principle, but always with the
qualification that our computing has to do with "true
moral denominations."
Burke in 1791 urged Parliament to "fly from the
French Revolution," by which he meant that all sober
Englishmen should fly from the Revolution's spirit of
moral unboundedness and political utopianism back to
the safer realms of moral realism and political prudence. That warning, I think, is as relevant today as
it was in 1791, and it makes Burke truly and forever
our contemporary.
~~
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Apples
Looking out her window,
She doesn't see the pine
With its staggering,
Blue-tipped branches, the pocked snow,
Or the sun causing the ice to stir.
She sees a scale against a black background,
One side swinging crazily
Because of the apples
Falling, for no apparent reason,
On the other side.
She's adding things upHer husband's death,
Her life as flat and cold
As snow held narrow by squinting.
Her child sits alone in his room,
Unseeing, riveted
To a circle inside himself;
And he will not speak.
And for happiness? That side?
Days, she finds, caught up
With the commonplace.
A small curved lamp
And her husband alive.
Evening purple around the edges
And she standing in her garden,
The smell of the earth rising
In a rough coolness.
But on the other side
She sees a crowd of people
Whose faces she cannot see.
They are hungry.
They are moving, shifting
Their hunched positions
With a gravity and weariness
She cannot watch.
An apple falls,
And the other side jerks down.

Kim Bridgford
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Megan Wolfe

THE SEDUCTION OF SILENCE
Or, the Deafy's Progress

Utopia means "Nowhere." By definition, locating a
utopia in time and space is a difficult task. The difficulty
remains even when the utopia proposed is a specialized
one, focused on a single issue. A good example is Mark
Medoffs Children of a Lesser God, a work fumbling towards
the idea of a utopia for deaf people: the deaf and the hearing, Medoff argues, can meet as equals only in "another
place, not in silence or in sound but somewhere else."
These two states of being clash with the romance of
a woman, Sarah Norman, deaf since birth, and her
would-be speech therapist, James Leeds, who wants
her to speak and thus to function as a hearing person
would. When he discovers that she is determined
never to speak or lipread, he has to realize that she is
not rejecting him. Likewise, the deaf woman has to
realize that she loses a great deal either way: in a life
with her hearing beloved or in a retre~l.t to her own intensely private state of being. When the story concludes, the two of them are promising to look for their
utopia. Unless they plan to start mindreading, such a
place would have to incorporate elements of both
speech and sign, a synthesis where communication
uses two distinct forms of language simultaneously.
Both the stage and film versions of Children of a Lesser God propose this utopia without really getting there.
True, Leeds interprets all the signing of all the deaf
characters. This speaking and signing at the same time
is called "total communication," a technique promoted
recently by educators of the deaf and most often used
by speech therapists.
However, Children does not use total communication
with an eye to a deaf audience as well as a hearing
one. Oral translation of signing is not complemented
by sign translation of speech. Though there have been
a few signed and captioned performances of Children,
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the work makes no intrinsic effort to embody the form
of communication which it proposes, finally, as its
ideal. It remains a hearing person's movie--or is saved
from this limitation only by one unpredictable factor,
the performance and personality of the actress who
plays Sarah Norman.
Marlee Matlin has swept most of the major acting
awards for women this year. More than one male friend
of mine calls Matlin "a hot number." Her hearing impairment seems so fully assimilated into her alert, sensual, and intelligent presence that deafness becomes a
much smaller issue than its severity would suggest. Of
course, that's an actress for you. No doubt she has offdays like the rest of us.
Much more than the stage Children, the film emphasizes romance, eliminating an early-Seventies social-consciousness subplot in favor of a slicked-up sexual tension between Matlin's character and William
Hurt's speech therapist. Some critics look down on the
film for this reason. Quite a few others weren't troubled, appreciating Matlin's contribution in particular:
she brings to life for a hearing audience the intensity
of anger and sensuality that can suffuse the whole
existence of the deaf.
A glance at Matlin's personal background, culled
from a variety of newspaper and magazine interviews:
she lost her hearing at the age of eighteen months
from a bout with roseola; she went to public schools,
wears hearing aids, and speaks. She credits her parents with strong support. She performed with the
Children's Theatre of the Deaf, and, once out of high
school, played a supporting role in the stage version of
Children in Chicago. From there she landed the role of
Sarah in the movie version. She now has an on-again,
off-again romance with Hurt, and has been signed to
make another movie. She does not use the telephone
and must lipread .
Through all of the interviews and features, one detail stands out: although she can speak English-and
evidently Italianl-she does not do so in public. She is
no less adamantly silent than Sarah Norman. She reThe Cresset

sponds to- interviews not in total communication, but
strictly in sign language (which then must be interpreted for hearing reporters); her acceptance speech
at the Globe ceremony was also signed. Not only does
she get away with this kind of maneuver, she uses it
to her advantage. It seems to increase her charisma
rather than to expose her as the village idiot. Here is
a Quasimodo who has become Esmeralda, a glamorous
metamorphosis.
My initial reaction to Matlin's success was suspicion.
Though I am hearing-impaired myself, I speak and
have long been proud of never needing to sign. I've
governed my life toward trying to fit in the hearing
world, calculating that I was only as deaf as I allowed
myself to be. What does Matlin think she is doing, to
pretend an inarticulateness her accomplishments and
ability to speak do not support? Is there a reason
other than the vanity of the actress for her to remain
in character to this extent? What does this public signing contribute toward utopia? We have a stake in this,
you and I. For most people, whether hearing or deaf,
the very idea of a deaf actress, a deaf professional
communicator, challenges the basis of human communication as it is generally understood.
My suspicion and potential contempt for Matlin's
signing could be seen as the preference of one deaf
woman to take the "harder" route by speaking in
every circumstance over another's choice to take the
"easier" route by never speaking in public any more
than many people never wear their glasses in public.
But that was only my initial reaction, from the habit
of being a hard-of-hearing woman who grew up in a
strictly hearing environment. Quieter reflection and a
closer look made the situation more complex. For one
thing, not only is it a bit of a strain to listen to a deaf
person speak, it's more natural for the deaf communicator to express feeling and nuance by movement, facial expression, etc., than by voice. For
another thing, I came by this knowledge the hard way,
since for the last twelve years I've been not hard-ofhearing but profoundly deaf.
I started out at a very young age with a borderline
moderate/severe loss, learned to speak, and grew up
with nothing worse than a 75dB loss. There are plenty
of books available in public libraries which outline the
four categories of hearing loss, mild, moderate, severe,
and profound. A person with a profound loss, 90dB
or worse, is considered deaf rather than hard of hearing, because although many with a profound loss are
able to hear a little with hearing aids, the sound is so
greatly distorted that speech discrimination is greatly
hampered.
Most people who use sign language have very severe
or profound losses. Even then, many of them can and
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do speak. Hearing loss and the efficacy of hearing aids
and speech differ from person to person, established
by age of onset of loss, degree of loss, kind of loss, environmental factors such as parental support and
schools, pain thresholds, distortion thresholds, economic and intelligence factors, and, most daunting
and elusive of all-personal preference.

Though I am hearing-impaired myself,
I speak and have long been proud of
never needing to use sign language.
I've governed my life toward trying
to fit in the hearing world,
calculating that I was only as deaf
as I allowed myself to be.
My own profound hearing loss happened very suddenly, in the middle of college: professors developed
strange accents, family members became short-tempered with me, the phone company sloughed off on
quality control, and stairs and corners started moving
of their own free will. Sound was still coming in, but
once in, became tangled up. This is what it was like to
go directly from a 75dB to a 97dB loss. But since I
could already speak, lipread, and had a crazy amount
of energy, I continued as a hard-of-hearing person,
having only to give up the telephone . .. a few friends
... a couple dozen job opportunities . . . . Thus began
my "deafy's progress."
At first, there was no reason to feel particularly
hampered, except for the same technology which
brought about hearing aids: modern society's demigod, the telephone. Once out of the protective collegiate environment, the deaf would-be professional
finds that life is closing in. It is sometimes easier in a
big city with many deaf organizations, or if one is
lucky enough to have the right connections.
Most deaf professionals in one survey I read got
their jobs through a relative who had some kind of
clout in a corporation, or in schools for the deaf; these
people were able to convince managers that telephone
use was not the he-all and end-all of employability.
Such opportumues are rare, however. Likewise
friendships and social opportunities diminish rapidly
for the deaf person who becomes, in essence, permanently unlisted.
Two other problems caught up with me a little later.
One was mainly physical, the other, well, social and
emotional. The physical problem was speaking. As the
memory of clear human speech faded away, speaking
itself became more and more difficult. My facial and
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neck muscles tightened so much I would get blinding
headaches; therapy brought this under control, making speaking easier insofar as it was less obstructed,
but the clarity was obviously diminishing. Increasingly,
as I went about doing homeowner things like ordering
lumber, applying for loans, getting a credit card,
license plates, etc., people misunderstood me.
Finally, two years ago, after an embarrassing afternoon of telling clerks my name was "Terry" and having them write or call me "Karen"-three different
times in one afternoon-! swore that I would never
give the name I couldn't pronounce again. Expand
this to more and more words, and speaking became a
harrowing ordeal. I felt awful, the clerks felt awful,
and occasionally, when they didn't feel awful, they
made me feel worse-incompetent. To a certain extent
they were right. I was a semi-competent spokesperson
for my own welfare.
The social and emotional problem is one common to
many people, deaf or otherwise: disillusionment with
the world in general. The hearing world I strove to be
a part of wasn't all that interesting. People not only
said the same old stuff to me, they said it to each
other. What people got out of this activity, I discovered, was the reassuring noise of another's sympathetic
VOICe.

It's what's implied, shared, chuckled over that makes
for good company. I can make the words, but I can't
make the noises. I don't hear them so they don't reassure me. I can't make them, so I can't reassure others.
In order not to cut myself off entirely from society, I
smile, I nod. It's a performance: lipreading, making
words, deducing context, laughing in all the right
places at jokes I can't hear. But the play never stops.
Matlin isn't offstage, either, when she's signing to an
interviewer. Yet imagine the difference: with a carefully selected interpreter, she has the ease to take in
her interviewer's body language while other nuances
are supplied to her through signs. She's not straining;
she conveys no more tension than anyone else would
in such a situation. She answers the question, face
alert, never struggling to make sounds which to her
are only abstract notions, but signing with feeling and
grace.
The listener/viewer, meanwhile, can relax, too, hearing the right words in a natural, reassuring way, while
feasting his eyes on an expressive, relaxed face and a
pair of quick, elegant arms. Everyone is doing what he
or she does best. Perhaps they spend half the interview going over banalities, but a goodly amount of
simpatico is established, and no one has to feel stupid
or exasperated. In this I recognize more dignity and
normality than I could ever achieve in all but the most
private of situations with my closest friends and rela14

tions.
In spring, 1981, I took a course in Signing Exact
English.* I learned quickly, and enjoyed it, but since
there was no one else around to sign with, it faded
from memory. Furthermore, even though I was deaf,
I knew precious little about being deaf. Most of my ideas
on the subject were vague notions, a natural outcome of
having no one with whom to share my experiences.
Since I didn't know anyone else who was deaf, a little research was in order. I wanted to answer some
questions. Is the deaf world-the signing world-a
ghetto? I'd long understood through others that my
having gone to public school and my relatively good
speech were incredibly good luck. But sign language
has its attraction too. So, then, what is the social potential of signing as a language? Would there be any
point in trying to use it in Valparaiso, Indiana, where
I lived for fourteen years without ever running into
another deaf person-and where nobody was going to
provide me with an interpreter?

Two years ago, after an embarrassing
afternoon of telling clerks my name
was "Terry" and having them write or
call me "Karen"-three different
times in one afternoon-1 swore that
I would never give the name
couldn't pronounce again.
The first thing I learned about was the centuries-old
struggle between the manualists and the oralists. Most
schools for the deaf in this country are predominantly
oral; the two best-known colleges, Gallaudet and the
National Technical Institute for the Deaf, are sign
schools. The differences are significant. Oralists consider signing to be a cop-out. If signing is available,
they argue, the deaf person will not work so hard to
speak and lipread. I can vouch for that.
I can also vouch for how hard it is continously to
speak and lipread whenever I need to communicate,
leaving less and less energy for plain old thinking.
Books on the psychology of the deaf and interviews
with accomplished deaf people indicate that the deaf
are almost always more comfortable alone or with each
other than in hearing society. Many experiments have
*SEE is comprised of signs which represent English words.
American Sign Language (ASL) is comprised of signs
which represent utterances; the grammar is consequently
different from standard English: among other details,
tense is established first, and there are no verbs of being.
The Cresset

shown that signing is something which arises spontaneously in deaf children, even if they are not taught.
Other examinations have declared ASL to be a fullfledged language in its own right and not a mere pidgin.
There are communities where there is a higher
proportion of deaf to hearing, mostly on the East and
West coasts; interpreters are easily available, employment levels are comparable with hearing workers'.
Children who go to oralist state schools seem to have
the worst time of it, with most achieving only a fifthgrade reading level after some fourteen or fifteen
years of schooling. As of 1974, 10 per cent of the college-age deaf population went to college (about half of
the eligible hearing population attends); of that 10 per
cent, only 2 per cent achieved professional-level employment, although figures since then likely have improved, especially on the West coast.
Speaking and lipreading achievement among the
deaf population as a whole seemed to be arbitrary,
highly dependent on talent; some of the most highly
motivated were not necessarily among the highest
achievers in their hearing loss and educational levels.
Those who can speak, do so; those who can't don't
worry about it. All in all, it is a rather mixed picture.
I read so many praises of signing and its negation
of inarticulateness, of signing even under the threat of
severe punishment (in oralist schools), that the deaf
world began to seem a ghetto-in both a positive and
a negative sense. Ease of communication is imperative
for the development of self-esteem and a sense of belonging to some kind of community. The "arrogance"
of the deaf community, as in the student body at Gallaudet, is commonly noted even by friendly observers.
When allowed to do what they do best-kibbitz in
sign-the deaf develop a self-esteem which does not
allow for a pathological definition of their condition.
The hearing world almost inevitably sees deafness as
an unqualified misfortune. Given the right to convene,
to reaffirm their experience of the world, the deaf do
not. Their consequent "arrogance" comes from belonging to a minority whose approach toward life is
different from the hearing world's. Deaf people mock
the hearing world's dependence on the telephone.
They also deplore the hearing world's sorrow for
them: poor deafies not hear bird sing. To adapt an
old philosophical conundrum: if a tree falls in a forest,
and no one hears it, does it make a sound? Failing to
hear the birdies tweet is hardly a great tragedy for
those who have been deaf most of their lives; as Sarah
Norman says, her deafness is a silence full of sound.
It is not deafness which produces anger but the misunderstanding of the possibilities in deafness.
One possibility which hearing people could easily
April, 1987

share is sign language. However, bilingualism of any
kind has always been an uneasy issue in this country,
where the population is made up of immigrants and
their descendants. The sense of nationhood, of status
quo, is expressed by a shared language. People who
earned the right to citizenship and jobs in our country
are outraged when another ethnic group has a potentially easier ride to the same citizenship and jobs-at
their expense, and without the new group's contribution toward a sense of nationhood by sharing in the
language of the majority.

The hearing world almost inevitably
sees deafness as an unqualified
misfortune. Given the right to
convene, to reaffirm their experience
of the world, the deaf do not. They
deplore the hearing world's sorrow for
them: poor deafies not hear bird sing.
At the same time, no language is totally translatable
into another, and what is lost in translation is heritage,
an approach to the world and life which makes possible "detente," "yo' mamma," and "me-deafy." I've seen
how frequent films and television programs featuring
jive resulted in midwestern farmers using jive phrases
in their lighter moments-not that they showed any
flair for jive but they certainly appreciated the feel of
the phrases and were certain that jive expressed something straight English could not.
It's possible to sell anything in America if you can
package it the right way. Marlee Matlin is one great
package. A few more like her in mainstream entertainment and deafness-perhaps even signing-will lose its
pathological connotations. Knowing a few basic signs
won't make you want to be deaf any more than knowing a couple of jive phrases makes white farmers want
to be black inner-city men. But you might come to understand that the blacks and the deaf are sufficiently
comfortable with who/what they are, so that they do
not wish they were you.
Thus instilled with a newfound sense of Deaf Pride,
I dusted off my old Signing Exact English manuals
and practiced; within a few days most of the vocabulary I had before was mine again. A library copy of an
ASL guide provided a pleasant surprise: many of the
signs were the same as in SEE. I tried out signing,
both with and without simultaneously speaking, on my
husband, my friends, my son, and while running errands. Reception was positive; everybody wanted to
learn more, and encouraged me to locate a good
15

teacher.
Reception in the world at large was particularly interesting: by signing, I made others aware that I was
deaf; they took a little more care in their speaking,
used many more gestures, and I must admit that instead of making me feel stupid it greatly eased my
nervousness about having continually to guess at everything. At the same time people were undeniably relieved that I could speak to them. Books are full of
methods for "mainstreaming" the deaf, from oralism
to vocational training. Trying out signs on perfect
strangers, I discovered that it's not the deaf who need
to be mainstreamed, but language itself.
The following week featured the National Theatre
of the Deaf, performing The Heart is a Lonely Hunter
in the Great Hall of the Valparaiso University Union.
The play was not the only show. The Union was
packed with people more than an hour before the
production, clumps of the deaf signing rapidly to one
another, more slowly to their hearing friends, as if
haggling over politics and prices in a Turkish bazaar.
I had never seen anything like it.
It was wonderful, not only because here was a
hitherto unimagined roomful of people more or less
like me, but also because, for the first time in memory,
I could follow nearly any conversation I chose. Long
ago, I groaned learning Latin declensions and French
phrases; with only a beginner's vocabulary I was able
to converse both in Exact English and ASL. An hour
passed quickly. There were two lines, and signs up
everywhere announcing that the deaf had preferential
seating. Walking to the deafline, I felt as ifl were making
the most significant decision of my life. Turning to look
at the hearing line, I saw several VU friends: "Oh, yeah!"
they yelled, "we forgot about you!"
Once the doors were opened and people could sit
down, I realized that many of the deaf were having
the same banal, trite conversations that I had deplored
in hearing people. The difference was mainly in the
visual orientation: nuance and communal spirit were
conveyed by how signs were made rather than by how
words were spoken. This time it had the desired impact: we were able to break our social solitude, the
most mundane of things taking on character because
we were unhampered in our expression and reception
of them.
Not everyone was forthcoming, or even pleasantone peppery little deaf woman came to my row intending to sit down, only to discover I had saved seats
for my own guests. She said insulting things to me in
rapid-fire sign, declared me a hearing person who was
cheating, and strutted away, sign-muttering to herself.
People nearby looked at me expectantly. I signed
something rude to her back; we all laughed. Retorts
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are not something the deaf often get to make in a
hearing situation.
When the play began, the signing was slow and measured, accompanied by vocal interpretation. It speeded
up as the play progressed; I found, in my inexperience, that I could not follow the fingerspelling. Some
of the actors spoke and signed at the same time, or
spoke interpretations while others signed. Some of the
actors signed only. Some spoke while others signed in
interpretation. Despite the complexities of this shared
effort, it was always clear which character was in the
limelight, no matter which method he or she chose to
convey lines.

Once I started to sign, people took a
little more care in their speaking,
used many more gestures. I must
admit that instead of making me feel
stupid, it greatly eased my
nervousness about having continually
to guess at everything.
I sat in the front row, to the right of center, which
turned out to be the best seat in the house, nearly
nose-to-nose with the heroine Mick Kelly, played by
Elena Blue. While Blue's was not the only outstanding
performance, it was the nearest to Matlin's: she never
spoke, and from my vantage point she seemed largerthan-life, like Matlin on the screen. Here I could seewithout the manipulation of a camera's viewpoint-the
potency of the deaf actress.
Blue is a superb mime artist. She does not merely
sign, but silently recreates the sensations of dramatic
experience, performing convincing depictions of swimming, falling in love, composing music in her head.
The swift, hormonal mood changes of her character
could be followed without any doubt. And her performance is designed to work powerfully within the
strong framework of ensemble acting.
The sensation of understanding more than one kind
of communication at once is revealing: utterances are
given confirmation, reinforcement, and aura; the signing and speaking become each other's halo, while the
miming gives them the authority of a particular interpretation. Mick Kelly's daydream of jumping into
the water and swimming is no abstract notion, subject
to the listener's experience or lack of it; we are given
a very particular sensation through Blue's miming,
down to the glub-glub and awkwardness of underwater movement. This is an irreplaceable clarity, one of
many such moments invented by NTD.
The Cresset

The NTD provides us with a place where sound and
silence meet. Can this meeting be anything more than
an aesthetic triumph? Heart reminds us that what happens in the real world is not necessarily like what happens in a play. We are never allowed to forget a governing irony: the deaf characters, Mr. Singer and his
backward friend, are played by the only actors who
never sign. Although kindhearted Mr. Singer remains
uninstitutionalized, he is denied, both in the script and
in the production, any language save writing. Once he
is deprived of his simple but expressive sidekick, his
isolation seems complete. In this aesthetic utopia
created by a theatrical production, the suicide of the
deaf man with the little pad of paper takes on a significance beyond particulars of plot.
Getting utopia off the stage and into the world
would require a further effort, though what kind of
effort is not immediately clear. Schoolchildren are usually eager to learn some version of sign (note Sesame
Street's efforts in this direction). ASL's status as a second-language equivalent in many places also helps. At
the same time, the deaf who can speak and lipread
might well want to take their signing out into the
world. By using total communication, they will make
signing more familiar in places without large deaf
communities, and thus pave the way for the deaf who
cannot speak or lipread.
History suggests that alteration of linguistic custom
cannot, by its nature, be legislated or decreed (despite
the illusions of politicans on both sides of the bilingualism controversy). Can we hope for a change of
heart, then? Only if signing is seen as an enrichment
of the language will elements of it pass into general
use. Marlee Matlin's compelling stubbornness and the
National Theatre of the Deafs wonderful production
are both pointers, but no more than pointers, in this
utopian direction. The mainstreaming of language itself is yet to be accomplished-so in this sense the
deafy's progress continues.
Cl
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Sensation of Flight
They told me this was an airplane.
They said we would go to Chicago.
They lied.
If they had said it was a seaplane,
I would never have embarked.
They say we are taking off! feel us going down.
Flight attendants should not be mermaids;
Airplanes should not have periscopes;
They lied.
And now I am deep down under;
The captain says 20,000 feet .
Or was it "leagues"?
No one else notices.
They are fooled.
Or maybe they are just too scared
To realize.
I check this out with a stewardess.
She is amazed.
With the wisdom of Salome she asks
How things are at home.
And I tell her about you,
About us.
Her reaction is swift:
She thinks this the reason
That this plane has sunk
Deep down inside me.
She calls me Jonah.
She thinks my lighter a terrorist bomb.
She orders me to abandon my thoughts
Or they will have to abandon me.
Will she leave me a life jacket?

William Bein
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Alan Graebner

CATALOGING OUR TIMES
An Archival Report on How We Live Now

For the past seventeen years I have lived in the
same place. My children have lived all their lives in the
same house. To understand why I find that remarkable, you must know that I can remember calling
"home" fourteen different places in six states. My experience in both mobility and stability produces dogmatism on several topics. I know how to pack boxes
and U-Haul trucks. I am also intimately acquainted
with the effect of moving (or not moving) on levels of
accumulation.
Every time I moved, I faced decisions about saving
or pitching. The bias was toward pitching. But when
I stopped moving, nothing forced choices. Stability in
residence reinforced boyhood lessons, when saving
and recycling was next to the cleanliness proximate to
sainthood.
Sooner or later, of course, the detritus of contemporary existence exceeds the space available. When, as in
our household, an amateur carpenter and an erstwhile
seamstress are resident, capacity is exceeded sooner
rather than later. Both carpenters and seamstresses
generate and need odd-parts piles. But the result has
not been conducive to marital harmony because a carpenter's and a seamstress's definitions of good stuff
and useless scrap are radically different. The chaotic
overcrowding in my space is compared pejoratively to
the snug, lean order in my spouse's space. And vice
versa.
Our domestic tranquility is threatened still more because I am a historian. Historians are packrats, of
course, but we attach professional privilege to our predilection. The sanctity of saving is to the historian
what the confidentiality of the confessional is to the

Alan Graebner, a graduate of Valparaiso University,
teaches History at the College of St. Catherine in St. Paul,
Minnesota. He is the author of After Eve (1972) and Uncertain Saints: The Laity in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 1900-1970 (1975).

18

clergy. The result is even dignified by a name. Historians maintain archives. There is a clear line between
an archive and what should have been thrown out a
long time ago. What I save is my archive. What you
save is your junk.

The sanctity of saving is to the
historian what the confidentiality of
the confessional is to the clergy.
The result is even dignified by a
name. Historians maintain archives.
To the dismay of others in my household, I have
taken my professional obligations seriously. My incoming and outgoing files are complete enough that the
curious researcher centuries hence will get quite a
good idea of the letters received and written by a runof-the-mill, middle-aged college professor in the
American Middle West during the later twentieth century.
There are, however, some regrettable lacunae. I do
not save shopping lists, church bulletins, or directions
scribbled for the children to follow before I get home.
The decision against saving those was made some
years ago, forced by a more peripatetic life then. I
have stood by those decisions despite misgivings from
time to time. I hope the consequent omissions will not
mislead the future.
Recently, however, I became aware of a larger gap.
I have not been saving mail order catalogs. It did not
occur to me twenty-five years ago to begin saving
catalogs because all we had then was the Sears wishbook.
Times have changed. We live in a catalog age. An
awesome stream flows through our mailbox. There are
freshets and slack water in that stream, but it flows
ever on. We are inundated, our name spelled a halfdozen ways or occasionally reduced to some character
The Cresset

called Resident. Most of the catalogs simply appear in
our mailbox; I never heard of the firms before and
never order from them.
But that makes no difference. We always get more.
I would have been dumbfounded as a boy at what my
children take for granted. They peruse pages that feature in full color all manner of camping gear, sound
equipment, electronic gadgets, outdoor clothing, provocative negligees, boating supplies, and cooking
exotica-only an 800 number, a plastic card, and UPS
away.

To document the texture of our lives,
mail order catalogs clearly ought to
be saved. But when historians are
called to account in the final
reckoning, I shall have to be among
the old goats who use Adam's gambit.
The fault lies with my mate.
This is serious. To document the texture of our lives
these catalogs clearly ought to be saved. But when historians are called to account in the final reckoning, I
shall have to be among the old goats who use Adam's
gambit. The fault lies with my mate. Our interpersonal
relationship would be difficult to sustain successfully
were I to preserve catalogs. She'd move out. Actually
I would have to move too. There would not be room
for us.
Musing on my dilemma some months ago, I concluded a half-way measure was better than none. Instead of hustling unsolicited catalogs directly into the
kitchen trash can under the sink, I decided to tear off
and save the covers. Even as I did that, however, I discovered certain choices had to be made. I elected not
to dignify flyers received from department stores and
credit card outfits, nor from local establishments announcing their current specials. I would tear the covers only from substantial catalogs offering merchandise on a continuing basis.
I conscientiously followed my plan. After tossing
those covers onto a pile in the study for three months,
I am now prepared to make a report. In the past
quarter we have received catalogs from the following
(I list in order received, eliminating duplicate titles):
AMT Power Tools Plus, Adam York, Sailors Bookshelf, Markline, Work Shops, Winter Silks, Leichtung,
Sierra Club, Deerskin, Exeters, Mystic Seaport
Museum, Allen Harbor, Barclay Collection, Swiss Colony, Coach Leatherwear, DAK Industries, Sharper
Image, Campmoor, Vermont Country Store, Early
April, 1987

Winters, Casual Living, Impact 2000, Lillian Vernon,
Brigade Quartermasters, Library of Congress, Unicorn
Gallery, Rittenhouse Grandfather Clock, Sync,
Cuddledown of Maine, National Trust, Nature Company, French Creek Sheep and Wool, Jos. A. Bank,
Childcraft, Damart, Metropolitan Museum of Art,
Night 'n Day Intimates, Museum of Fine Arts (Boston), Orvis, Sunnyland Farms, Hartmarx, Ramer 86,
Miles Kimball, and Nieman Marcus.
In addition to these, I should also mention the
catalogs whose covers I did not tear off, i.e., the
catalogs that went as a whole onto our catalog shelf for
future study and possible ordering. The contents of
that shelf are as follows (my listing is from top to bottom; I exclude out-of-date catalogs, but include the
publication whose cover I tore off by mistake and had
to tape back on): Highsmith Office, Lands' End,
Shaker Workshops, Nordisco, Woodcraft, West
Marine, L. L. Bean, REI, Company Store, Wood-

The Death Index
The yellow grass was dying, matted
fifty feet back from the last war
memorial anyone might fund. I stood
where something might survive
this summer, saw little of the letters,
and walked forward until they arranged
themselves into an index of death.
I thought of names I knew, one by one,
faces fifteen years younger than mine.
I figured eleven was enough, but when
I cupped my camera in one hand,
self-conscious tics broke out on me,
blurring the snapshot of names.
I tried to call up captions
for each Asian death; I traced ten
columns and stopped since those I knew
turned breathless there; I was going
to tell someone to fence off the grass,
keep everything from going to mud
by August; I was going to slide sideways,
read the unlucky name listed last
on my right, like starting a fool's glossary,
reference for things undone.

Gary Fincke
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worker's Supply, The Mind's Eye, NEBS, Wireless,
Renovator's Supply, Eddie Bauer, Williams-Sonoma, International Mountain Equipment, Early's, Chouinard Equipment, Talbot's, Klockit, Goldberg's Marine,
Van Bourgondien Bros, Crutchfield, Thos. Moser, Crate
and Barrel, Macomber, Spring Hill, White Flower Farm,
Patagonia, Smith & Hawken, David Kay, Wear Guard,
Fidelity, Trendlines, Saffran, and Brookstone.

No doubt the people in consumer
demographics could examine my catalogs
and tell me I am a married male
between 45 and 50, with grey hair
parted on the left, who has 1.83
children and mows my own lawn in a
pattern from house to street.

No doubt the people in consumer demographics
could examine those lists and tell me I am a married
male between 45 and 50, with grey hair parted on the
left, who has 1.83 children and mows my own lawn in
a pattern from house to street. A real expert, knowing
which firm buys what list, might even be able to do a
geneological chart on these catalogs: REI begat International Mountain Sport, who begat Patagonia, who
begat West Marine, who begat . .. , and so on. The
lists may prove that I am a catalog junkie in the terminal stages of addiction. Or, for all I know, I have
documented a catalog drought that has befallen the
Upper Midwest. I leave interpretation to others. Mine
is simply an archival function.
Having set the record straight regarding the catalogs
we received in ninety days, I discarded the pile of covers with a clear conscience. I have done what I can to
help future generations understand how we live.
Lately, however, I have noticed that practically every
day the letter carrier drops into our box two or three
or four letters imploring us to send contributions to
some worthy cause. I have not been saving those letters. Years ago I concluded not to save mass mailings,
but that was when we received perhaps one importunate letter a fortnight. Now charitable and educational
institutions seem only a step behind the catalog merchandisers.
There is no time to open and read that mail. I only
study the envelopes to compare: the inventive teaser
on the face of one, the demands that I open immediately printed on another, the coy anonymity of a
third. We take this mail as much for granted as death
and taxes. Indeed, given the decline of private letter-
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writing that has resulted from direct distance dialing,
without catalogs and these fund-raising letters, our
mailbox would most days be a curious artifact of an
earlier age, our equivalent of the hitching block or the
full-service gasoline station .
These soliciting letters are a significant part of
American life. Might we explain the growing impersonalization of American society by the thick skins one
must develop to sort efficiently through each day's
mail? The future historian could not even hazard a
guess without reading this mail. And yet I have not
been saving any of it. There is so much.
Perhaps if I just tore off return addresses and threw
them in a drawer for a tirrie?
Cl

Levels
We watch the last train
clicking past, dragging a sound
long after the lights are gone,
no other echoes but jets
high in a black sky,
people we'll never see
rising and strolling the rows
over our farm. A stewardess
may glance out at the dark
while she waits handing vodka
to a man reaching his card
to someone by the window.
Between them , a child
crossing a continent to visit daddy
thinks of her mother
back at the airport
waving goodby.
The pilot points at another jet's
contrails crossing above them ,
but passengers sipping drinks
flip pages with lagoons
they'll never see,
or if they do glance up,
all they see are lights.

Walter McDonald
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Moebie on Malls
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
Moebie upon returning from one of
her silent mountains was herself quiet
for a long time when we went walking.
I was in no hurry to hear what opinions
if any she had come down with. There
are old paths in this area of Virginia,
old chimneys hidden among the trees
on the slopes above the lake, where old
settlers spent weeks, probably, getting
stones arranged into what each hoped
would be part of a home, or at least a
warm contentment of some kind.
When she threw down a strand of
some weed she had been chewing, and
picked up her pace, I suspected Moebie
was through with silence. What she
said, as she picked her way along a
damp place in the shade, where the
walk got steeper, was that she was reconciling herself to shopping malls.
''I'm not the only one," she said.
"There is a new book on the subject by
a professor who has a summer home on
Montauk Point. Out there on Long Island, where you have nothing except
salt air and sea grass, you're vulnerable
to desire. What you desire, for one
thing, is enclosed, roofed acres. The
same is true up on the mountain."
I had thought this was a common
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idea, this craving of the absent contrast,
this inverse romanticism, this upsidedown atavism, and that something of a
better epiphany would have descended.
"A mall, unfortunately, is commerce," I said. "Possibly the enclosure
you want is an airplane hanger. The
large Boeing facility in Seattle, one of
the obvious and ... "
She cut me off decisively, and leaned
on a none-too-sturdy ash, arms crossed. "A mall is commerce," she said,
"precisely." "Commerce, when you
think of it, is precisely the most
human of all activities. Without
commerce there would be very little human in the mall at all. The
people are not human, the decor is
that of an upper-middle-class
mausoleum (not a gangster mausoleum, which is purple and tufted),
and the goods themselves are arranged on glass stands as if in a
museum." Moebie sometimes sees
significance in places where significances should be seen but have
been rendered absent, from scholars at least, in order to dawn on
people like David Letterman.
The place we were walking is
called Mint Springs, a county park
with only one access road. If several hundred people came to swim
at one time, and at one time decided to leave, this one small road
would, except for the dust, remind
an observer of the ramp-like concrete lanes coming out of most
American malls. People sitting in
lines behind small walls of tinted
glass, waiting for the air conditioning to get going. Temporarily 95
degrees on the way to 75.
"I don't see why commerce is the
most human of activities," I said.
"Nobody thinks that, and nobody is
going to think that. It is one of the
empty ideas of the world, such as
the idea that the Pope will be a
woman. Poland, yes, or Ayers Rock
conceivably, but not a woman."
"Commerce is a metaphor," she
responded calmly. "What we call
human is a transaction between two

and only two people, for mutual
benefit. As one person, you can be
beside yourself or be your own
worst enemy, and so forth and so
on, but you cannot sell yourself a
bill of goods. At the other extreme,
with three persons or more, attention is fractioned. Commerce in a
mall is the most human of activities
because two people exchange something worthless to each, but bring
to the exchange a pitch of desire
that has been in the making literally millennia. It has taken a long
time for us to imagine we want little ceramic frogs or ski boots with
battery-powered clasps."
"But not fine Belgian chocolates," I quickly rejoined. "Or a
cashmere sweater, or the Oxford English Dictionary. Most of what we
buy is not in fact worthless, and
our desire is not a false desire but
a real desire. Already in third
grade I wanted a red dictionary; it
was the Thorndike Century junior
Dictionary."

"I don't see why commerce
is the most human of
activities," I said.
"Nobody thinks that, and
nobody is going to think
that. It is one of the
empty ideas of the world."

Moebie has a distinctive withering gaze, even standing in the
shade. One could almost smell the
ashes on the long-vanished hearths
of the decayed cabins in the woods,
testified to by the remains of the
stone chimneys which we knew
were near though invisible.
"You have a habit of bringing in
cases," she said. "I don't know if
you've ever noticed," she said , "but
your mind inclines to cases, falls to
instances, conjures up things that
could conceivably exist."
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"Ceramic frogs are yours," I said,
feeling I had her.
"A time symbol, not an object at
all," she said. "Representative of
this end of the time spectrum, the
other end being primeval chaos.
Anyone actually buying a ceramic
frog could have any number of
motives-irony, benefaction, control of kleptomania. The kind of
transaction I am talking about is a
pure transaction for a pure discernible motive. A ceramic frog has no
possible destiny except a shelf, and
nothing bought for a shelf can be an
element in a true transaction."
"A book," I said. "A book lands
on a shelf."
"I thought we were having a serious conversation," she said, almost
despairingly, coming away from the
ash tree and trying to restore something of its perpendicularity. "A
book may land on a shelf, but it is
not bought for a shelf. It is bought
for the part of the mind that
wishes
a
certain
turbulence.
Whenever you have entropy ... "
This time it was I who interrupted, since she was evidently
right. I returned to the point lacking clarification. "Again," I said, "I
understand you to say that desire is
the most human of qualities, and
that in commerce we see desire at
its most pure."
She looked at me as if I were not
the serious person that I am, and I
could see in her eyes, those semiotic registries that at once admit
nothing but say almost everything
pertinent to the moment, that she
was asking herself: "Shall I give
him the benefit of the doubt?"
She did this, and continued. "Eve
would have paid for it. She got it
free, but she would have paid for
it. Then, later, she would have paid
more to have returned to the beginning of the day, to have the day
to live over. Are you really interested in preparing yourself to
argue that desire is not fundamental to us, and that the mall is not

22

the distinctive place where the descendants of modern man show
forth without dissimulation or embarrassment that their fundamental
humanity has survived?"
This was a lot, but I immediately
thought of quite other places where
humans behave like humans, such
as a new-car dealership, where one
can do some sincere and passionate
buying, and also the sort of large,
family-run greenhouse, where the
byproduct of your desire is the
strange and pathetic happiness of
the small proprietor who looks in
the face of every customer hoping
to find the grace and piety worthy
of a Queen Tammy Rose.

"The clerk in the mall,"
she said, "from the
moment of going to work
is aroused by a new
desire, unique I think,
in the history of
consciousness."
"I don't think the situation is at
all the same," she said, when I
mentioned such places. Her mildness disarmed me. "I assert the
need for enclosed places. You present instead an alfalfa field lately
paved over and glass-walled for automobiles. And you present a
greenhouse, where the sun shines
through, sometimes inspiring dark
songs. But there is something about
the complete enclosure of a mall
that intensifies desire."
"When you are outdoors inside a
new car, looking through the
windshield down the highway, you
see an Arby's sign and wish you
were inside eating, looking outside
at the highway," I said ruminatively.
"Instead
of
thinking
tachometer and its surcharge, you
are thinking about eating, which is
a strong desire."

"But eating is enclosing a thing
rather than being enclosed," she
said dismissively. "To be the container for, say, a Sacher torte. A
different and irrelevant thing."
She had picked up another
strand of some green thing and signaled her readiness to return by
the path we had taken, instead of
going on uphill a few more yards,
where the path, horseshoe in
shape, would turn downward to the
former pasture, now a park, entering at a point only a hundred yards
or so from where we would be
coming out. A person below would
think there were two paths, but
they are one path. I have thought
of commissioning and planting rustic signs at the start of each path,
with different names. Old Bear
Trail. Woody Ridge Trail. Like the
meaningless names of things m
malls.
"The meaningless names of
things in malls!" I said, at the same
time she said, "We are talking
about a very simple thing."
"Desire, though , this human
thing," I said, still confused, "is in
the customer, not in the cash-register clerk. How is there a distinctly
human transaction when desire is
only on the one side?" Again she
looked at me as if the force of my
remark, in its unwitting but brutal
ignorance, had set her imagining
that some serious beings fundamentally await irradiation by plain
sense.
"The clerk in the mall," she said,
"from the moment of going to
work is aroused by a new desire,
unique I think, in the history of
consciousness."
"Unless,"
she
added, thoughtfully, "the old kings
in hermetic castle-fortresses had it,
or fuehrers in bunkers, and
beowulfs in mead halls, and children in windowless attics." "The
desire," she said, "of eliciting from
each new human contact the smallest, remotest signal that although
metaphorical prisoners together
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there is some hope of escape. Not
escape together and triumph, and
not individual escape and reunion,
but simply escape. Escape first
from the setting itself and then (or
together) escape from desire."
"Not children," I said. "They
love warm hiding places. Fuehrers
too." She said nothing, evidently
struck by the collocation. Desire to
escape, desire to possess the shiver
of desire in eyes meeting, but two
different desires, like two instruments making noise, a canvas bagpipe and an early tuba.
"It may come later," she said.
"You may be right. After childhood." "A child's imagination," she
said, "is so well supplied with windows. An attic is a window into the
past, a wardrobe is a passage into a
snowy country. No wonder children always know that they have
what they want, even though they
act out their role as children by
saying they want things."
"You seem to be saying that only
the adult clerk and the adult customer are conscious of living for a
stretch of time in an enclosure of
goods, and that both the enclosure
and the goods act symbiotically to
confer ... "
". . . an intensity of desire, double desire-<lesire for escape and
for gratification-not experienced
elsewhere," she completed, decisively.
"But a bit melodramatic," I said.
"People do leave malls at any time.
It is not a question of 'escape.' "
"It is," she said. "Willing suspension of belief. People in malls lose
much of what is human-lose a
sense of time and space, lose their
belief that they can leave the place.
They leave only when by accident
their walking brings them in sight
of a glass door, and the cars
beyond."
She stopped there, and I wondered if her mind was returning to
its most recent place, the fertile
mountains, or forward to food. We
April, 1987

Still There
"the horse barn is still there . . "
the only sentence in the letter
that stayed with me all these years
there's something in that, I suppose,
something to wonder over ...
but nothing about the times in the warm kitchen
where Gram sat talking about Stokes and how she
would kill him and then fire him when she caught
up with him
nothing about the creek getting out and carrying off
the end house with Uncle Lute sitting astride it
cussing and waving his arms,
shouting "Out of the way ... "
nothing-nothing of the way the lights seemed to dim
on Christmas Eve when we gathered
in the big front room to wait for Claus!
where new cigars were choked on
and where euchre was played for blood .
until the rush of wind and knocking at the door
when we knew we were all lost and that Claus
was coming in, his eyes blazing,
the corn knife pointing at us as we ran
our little cars under the Dresden table
Tray sent back from Germany,
the same table Aunt Eff said she wanted buried with her .
just "the horse barn is still there ... "
not a monument to anything or a sign of something
we had then, some symbol of maybe who we wereyou couldn't have told it by that.
the long winter nights when we lay awake
in Grannie's bed and listened for the snuffle and howl
of wolves in the ravines might have told it
or the movement of the cows in their stancheons in the barn
or Autumn with ducks flying into the pale Illinois moon
but that's gone now-those farms and trees
the secret places we knew as boys,
save in this season of rain,
this time when trees brush against the house
and I stare at my face staring back in the half-light
of dusk I see or hear or smell it: the hay,
the warm breath of horses moving in the dark barn
hearing their hooves far away,
their heavy legs dipping in and out
of the long grasses

J. T. Ledbetter
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had planned a waffle. Walking
downward, we could hear the cars
on gravel as the sky widened
through the trees, and we could
hear the sounds of children in the
lake, excited in the water about
coming up out of it constantly
rather than being pulled down .
"What would it be like to escape
from being human, from the
prison of desire?" she asked. "And
to escape from anything that
looked like a wall." "Even the sky,"
she said, "looks like a wall."
"But trees do not," I said. 'The
spaces between them, where there
are enough of them to block out
the sky, seem very much like signs
of freedom," I observed, perhaps
wistfully, perhaps sounding like a
Boone or a Finn.
"The people you see in malls are
like moving trees," she said. "You
are always looking between them ,
for freedom." "But all you see," she
said, "are walls and goods."

"The people you see in
malls are like moving
trees," she said. ''You
are always looking
between them, for
freedom. But all you
see are walls and goods."

As I wiped the sun out of my
eyes, not quite successfully, I
glanced to the side and thought I
saw her taking a quick look back. It
did not seem to me as if she had
much reconciled herself to these
strange enclosures we had been
talking about, or to the people
within them , or their missions, or
their prospects. But we would have
to go on from here by car, and
Moebie likes cars, likes sitting in a
driven car.
From Dogwood, faithfully yours,
C.V.

C:
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National Holidays
Gail McGrew Eifrig
Things we are used to always
strike us as immutable, perhaps because we live so close to a carefully
limited, twenty-four-hour kind of
time. We forget that there was time
before this little slot we're concerned with momentarily-tomorrow's appointments, this month's
assignment, this year's contract. So
only a very short amount of time
has to pass for us to think "oh,
we've always done that," or "we've
never done that." Our memory
about our habitual or customary actions is surprisingly short.
When I was young, of course, I
never wondered about where holidays came from; they were just
there. Of course. Christmas, then
Lincoln's Birthday, then Valentine's, then Washington's Birthday,
and then Easter, sooner or later.
Memorial Day, then summer vacation , then Labor Day, then Columbus Day, Armistice Day, Thanksgiving, and finally , Christmas again.
There were also family birthdays,
private holidays, in fact almost secret holidays, since it was bad manners to tell people when your birthday was, though I can still remember what a surprise it was to

Gail McGrew Eifrig is Associate Prof essor of English at Valparaiso University and a regular contributor to The
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me to realize that not everybody
celebrated the day in May that certainly sounds to me like a holiday.
Holidays had different kinds of
observances-sometimes you went
to church (Christmas and Easter),
and sometimes you went to school
and not to church (Valentine's).
Sometimes you went to school and
to church (Ash Wednesday), and
sometimes you didn't go to school
or to church but to the fair
(Washington's Birthday) .
True, you midwesterners never
heard of a county fair in February,
but then you didn't have the Indio
Fairgrounds, built in pink stucco to
look like an Arabian Nights' palace,
surrounded by palm trees, and displaying prize grapefruits and dates
in the Exhibition Halls. I knew
from an early age who President
Washington was, because every
classroom in the school had his picture on the wall , but I never really
associated Washington's Birthday
with that grim old man. To me it
meant a day off school to go to
the fair-cotton candy, a horse
show, camel races, and the
Scheherezade Pageant m the
evening.

True, you midwesterners
never heard of a county
fair in February, but
then you didn't have
the Indio Fairgrounds.
One point to be drawn from this
personal digression is that most
holidays, certainly national ones,
are fluid rather than static. They
respond to the times, they meet
personal and regional needs in different ways, they shift and change
to reflect a shifting and changing
public. They function as reminders,
but they are reminders of different
things to different people.
Even Thanksgiving-one would
think a fairly uncomplicated naThe Cresset

tiona! observance with a universally
acceptable meaning-surely means
something to Native Americans
that it doesn't mean to the Cabots
and Lodges. And, since probably
nobody under forty understands
that reference, we could perceive
that even the most apparently universal meaning can be lost in a
short time in a pluralistic, relativistic society like ours.
The proposal to add Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s birthday to the
list of national holidays provoked a
great many arguments of all kinds,
some of them about King himself,
others about the bottom line costs
of having a holiday, others about
the devices of a deviously separatist
minority. When the Congress debated the issue, we read the most
spectacular of these arguments,
and then the vote was taken , and
the nation had settled on a new occasion. Its meaning is not entirely
settled; in fact, like many other of
our holidays, it means different
things to different people.
It doesn't seem to me that this is
all bad, so long as we will keep talking about it with each other. We
don't have to agree about King, or
about his birthday as a holiday, but
we do have to agree that the principle of discussion about our differences is the most important of national treasures.
I wish to mark this birthday because it places in such strong light
the amazing paradox of God choosing human beings to do His work.
Though I would prefer a god who
worked according to my principles
and refused to dirty his hands with
politics and with ordinary human
beings, a god who sent as his messengers creatures with superior
strength, high moral standards,
and a tremendous wingspan , I am
persuaded that He has chosen
otherwise. It is possible to be a
human being and a Christian, a
worker for justice and mercy in the
world that is here around us. In
April, 1987

Washington , in Memphis, in Porter
County.
And King's birthday reminds me
of that, uniting me with others who
also find this meaning powerful.
But even if my reasons are not
yours, let us agree that we will talk
about it. The truth about America
must be that we have decided not
to meet on battlefields as we go on
struggling to find out what it
means to be conceived in liberty
and dedicated to the proposition
that all people are created equal.
Where we do meet, let us continue
in good faith to make those noble
Cl
words into reality.

Crossing the Highway
In the hour before dawn,
enough gray to walk by,
the farm dogs asleep
until the first porch footfallsin five minutes, in tenand in one of those moments
I saw, far down the shoulder,
a small boy who would cross
the highway before
I reached him, following
the brief path of his game.
Hey! I thought and said nothing,
and silent watched for lights.
The hour was with him;
he entered a driveway
and left me remembering
the boy, last winter, who
froze in his back yard and lived,
brought back like an alien
in ice. The next car swept
darkened through the curve;
the first barking began,
that dog sensing a change,
how things had altered
in the shadowy child
who was climbing the stairs.

Gary Fincke

Not Quite at
Home in Indiana
Linda Ferguson
For those of us who occasionally
worry about provincialism-which
includes most midwesterners devoted to arts and letters-the life
and work of American composer
John J. Becker (1886-1961) holds a
special fascination. Becker's centennial was observed last November in
special anniversary concerts in San
Francisco and New York, all of
which met with favorable reviews,
and which generated commentary
on the hard lot of the American
composer in general and the regional composer in particular.
Robert Commanday of the San
Francisco Chronicle (November 8,
1986) began his review of the
Becker Birthday Bash at Dominican College with the phrase "the
hardly-remembered John Becker ... "
and noted that "his o~scurity is
usually attributed to the fa&t__ that
he remained in the Midwest, as a
teacher and administrator at Catholic colleges." In The Village Voice
(December 16, '1986), Kyle Gann
praised the all-Becker program of-

Linda Ferguson, who currently
teaches in the Department of Music at
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in the career of john Becker while
teaching at the University of Notre
Dame.
25

fered by the Alliance for American
Song and commended the New
York concert "establishment" for its
tribute to this midwesterner who
remains unacclaimed in his own
territory.
Although Becker worked almost
exclusively in the midwest, his manuscripts and memorabilia are now
held by the Library of the Performing Arts in New York's Lincoln
Center. His life and work have
been the subject of extensive research by Donald Gillespie, now on
the editorial staff of C. F. Peters, a
music publishing company which
has brought out editions of several
important Becker pieces. Gillespie's
doctoral dissertation ("John Becker,
Midwestern Musical Crusader,"
University of North Carolina, 1977)
and his brief article in the New
Groves describe Becker's career,
which culminated in his acceptance
into the avant-garde (as close
friend to Charles Ives and Henry
Cowell and long-time correspondent to Ezra Pound), followed by
his eventual decline into a pathetic
and isolated figure, his work
largely ignored by the end of his
own life.
Becker, along with Ives, Carl
Ruggles, Cowell, and Wallingford
Riegger, comprised a so-called
"American Five" of innovative
American music in the 1930s. The
aesthetic stance of the "Five" rejected the overt Americanisms
found in more accessible works of
composers such as Aaron Copland
in favor of a harsher and more intellectual approach to dissonance,
tone color, and texture; their
philosophy, more classic than
romantic, treated music as creation
of object rather than as imitation of
idea.
Clearly, Becker's name has not
received the degree of recognition
accorded his four associates, nor
has his music achieved the "standard repertoire" status of the
others. Still, Gillespie's findings re26

veal that Becker, his music, and his
philosophy were held in high esteem by his more prestigious colleagues.
Becker's direct personal and musical contact with the American
mainstream began in 1927, while
he was a professor of music at the
University of Notre Dame. A correspondence with Henry Cowell,
initiated by Becker in a sort of fan
letter, led to a genuine and lasting
friendship and provided the professionally isolated Becker with entree into circles of musical activity
far more sophisticated, exciting,
and rewarding than he could experience in Indiana.

Becker's direct personal
and musical contact
with the American
mainstream began while
he taught at Notre Dame.
Becker's subsequent contributions included large scale compositions, a few of which have been
programmed and recorded by leading orchestras. Leonard Bernstein
conducted a New York Philharmonic performance of the 1929
Symphonia Brevis in 1958, and both
that work and The Abongo are available in recordings by the Louisville
Orchestra.
Becker's contributions to the development and dissemination of a
consciously empirical, modern, and
expressly American approach to
composition were not limited to his
own compositions, for he served as
commentator, interpreter, and missionary of "difficult" modern music
to the general listening public. As
Gillespie has indicated, Becker's
role as a militant "crusader" has
been of lasting value in public acceptance and recognition of the
other members of the "American
Five": "In the longer view, he un-

doubtedly laid the ground for the
later acceptance in the Midwest of
his kind of music."
"His kind of music" is still difficult music. Ives and Cowell, the
best known members of Becker's
group, are associated with polytonality, tone clusters, dissonant
counterpoint, and violent percussive effects. Prior to Becker's associations with these experimental
composers, his work tended to a
conservative late-romantic style, derived from Germanic practice,
while his philosophy of music aspired to a more personal and innovative expression. Once he
found his identity as an "ultramodernist," his fierce beliefs could
be expressed musically. His radical
and somewhat quirky musical
views, conjoined with his devout religious beliefs, his profound sense
of social responsibility, and his liberal political sympathies make him
a colorful figure in the history of
American music and in the history
of culture in the midwest.
The issue is not that Becker's
music "sounds" American, for it
does not. Rather, the experiences
which shaped his history as a composer could only have occurred in
America. This self-styled cultural
innovator was born in 1886 in
Henderson, Kentucky, to German
immigrant parents, and moved
with his family at an early age
across the Ohio River to Evansville,
Indiana. The Beckers, devout
Roman Catholics, placed a high
value on traditional learning. They
arranged for piano lessons for
young John, beginning m his
eleventh year and continuing
through his graduation from
Evansville High School in 1903.
The family's emphasis on reading, conjoined with young Becker's
natural instincts toward music and
personal expression, resulted in
some ambitious compositional projects, all short-lived (and humorously recalled by Becker many
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years later). He read a biography
of Mozart, was thrilled and saddened by its tragic finish , and set
out to compose a Requiem Mass;
he read a biography of Beethoven
and commenced a series of string
quartets. It was the stories of these
composers' experiences which inspired him-not their music, for he
had not heard it.

He read a biography of
Mozart, was thrilled and
saddened by its tragic
finish, and set out to
compose a Requiem Mass.
As a piano student he did hear
Chopin Nocturnes, for he played
them, and they inspired a binge of
original nocturnes; more significantly, his study of J. S. Bach's Preludes and Fugues from The WellTempered Clavier resulted in a resolution to compose 48 Preludes and
Fugues. He did not fulfill this resolution, but the contrapuntal writing
of his mature years, undertaken
after disciplined and systematic
study, brought to fruition this early
inclination.
Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, and
Schiller were represented in the
Becker family library, but young
Becker's musical environment was
less classical. Evansville offered a
choral society and occasional
operettas, but the prevalent musical
culture, as in ·other midwestern
river towns, was that of the
minstrel show, the circus, and the
tavern. When John Becker left
Evansville in 1903 to attend the
Cincinnati Krueger Conservatory
(on a piano scholarship), he had
never heard a symphony orchestra,
and his experience with concert
repertoire was virtually limited to
what he could perform himself.
Becker flourished at the Cincinnati
Conservatory,
where
he
April, 1987

studied with the director, George
Krueger,
a
European-trained
pianist. When Krueger was appointed director of the fashionable
Kidd-Key Conservatory for Women
in Sherman, Texas, he recruited
Becker to join that faculty as a
piano instructor. From 1906-1914,
Becker held an appointment at
Kidd-Key, where the primary purpose was to bring European high
culture to the daughters and future
wives
of powerful
American
Not
surprisingly,
businessmen.
most of the faculty was imported.
Becker, native-born and schooled
in America, was relegated to secondary status, never assigned the better
students, never secure in professional or social circles. He Is recalled, however, as a good teacher and
as a pleasant, witty, and handsome
young man.
Since the process of "deprovincializing" wealthy young women
was not especially compatible with
Becker's musical aspirations, he
sought other challenges in addition
to his teaching. He took up conducting and secured his first jobs as
church musician, later taking over
the directorship of the local choral
society as well. Gillespie notes that,
as with most of his undertakings,

he took "an unconventional, empirical approach to choral directing."
In the summer interims, Becker
travelled back to Chicago, where he
worked as a clerk at Lyon and
Healey's music store in order to
pay for advanced lessons in organ,
piano, conducting, and composition. His most influential teacher
from this period was the distinguished German composer Alexander von Fielitz, whose songs and
piano pieces were widely known at
the time, and who had been director of the Leipzig Royal Opera.
Unlike many other "imported"
music teachers of the time, Von
Fielitz denied that European training was the path to musical salvation. He urged Becker not to travel
to Europe for study, but to remain
in America and to seek other inspiration . Von Fielitz' views that European culture had declined-aesthetically and morally-from its
nineteenth-century grandeur influenced young Becker to reflect
more systematically on the conflicts
he had already experienced between European high culture and
American provincialism.
In 1914, when a new European
director arrived at Kidd-Key Conservatory with the aim at improving
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the piano department by recruiting
and promoting pianists trained in
the Leschetizky method, Becker
resigned. His natural rebelliousness, more attuned to the spirit of
the American southwest than to the
European high culture he ostensibly promoted, seems to have translated itself into stubbornness and
the beginnings of the bitterness
which characterized his later years.
He returned to Evansville in
1915, where he married and immersed himself in a variety of civic
and charitable causes. He cofounded the first St. Vincent De
Paul Society in the State of Indiana, and he received a citation of
honor for his work for the Indiana
Red Cross. He organized touring
programs and entertainments for
civic groups and the military. One
of the circuits led to South Bend,
where he came to the attention of
Father John Cavanaugh, President
of the University of Notre Dame,
and Father Matthew Schumacher,
Director of Studies there.
In 1917 Becker was appointed
Professor of Music at Notre Dame,
and was given a special charge to
develop and administer a summer
program in the arts. The summer
programs, which began in 1918,
were the first co-educational opportunities at the University, which did
not admit women as regular students until 1972. Becker arranged
for prominent composers and performers to appear on the campus
in South Bend, and he also invited
younger, less well known musicians
to appear, including Otto Luening,
who was later to become a landmark figure in the history of electronic music. His aim was always to
educate and broaden the tastes of
his South Bend clientele, while resisting slavish tmttation of the
European model of culture.
Eventually Becker reshaped and
enlarged the entire Notre Dame
curriculum in music. When he became director of the music depart-
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ment in 1918, the faculty consisted
of three members. The program of
study offered training only in
piano, violin, and Gregorian chant,
along with the extra-curricular activities of the glee club and marching band. By 1925 he was directing
a faculty of fourteen, offering
more than forty courses in music,
with studies in voice and orchestra
as well as piano, and with majors in
both performance and composition.
Enrollments in music burgeoned
and a small graduate-level program
was instigated. Students under his
tutelage composed operas and
chamber mustc m traditional
nineteenth-century forms, but employing modern-and dissonantharmonic vocabulary.

It is not known how--or
if-Becker had actually
heard music by the new
composers whose virtues
he broadly extolled.
As an educator, Becker was intensely concerned with aesthetic
education and the philosophy of
music as it relates to liberal education in a conservative academic setting. His presence in the Notre
Dame/South Bend communities
must have been striking. His own
lectures in music history and aesthetics (apparently delivered as
"theatrical" displays) attempted to
connect music with art, philosophy,
literature, history , and life experience.
Becker's mission as educator extended beyond the campus boundaries to the South Bend community, where he was an active member
of civic organizations, a regular
performer and speaker, and author
of more than forty articles on musical topics for the local press.
These essays, on an astonishing
array of current musical topics,
most of which he had only the re-

motest knowledge of, reveal a
paradoxical mixture of provincialism, contradictory claims about
musical styles, provocative thoughts
about the role of the composer in
society, and some promising insights about composers unknown to
his readers, such as George Antheil, Ernst Krenek, and Kurt
Weill. It is not known how-or ifBecker had actually heard music by
the i~novative composers whose
virtues he extolled to his South
Bend readers.
Becker left Notre Dame in 1928
to take an appointment at St.
Mary's of the Springs in Columbus,
Ohio. This move coincided with the
maturation of his compositional
style, or rather the point at which
his compositional practices caught
up with his modernist rhetoric. Although much acclaimed at St.
Mary's, he stayed only until the
next year, when he moved to St.
Paul, Minnesota, to assume a position at St. Thomas College.
The Minnesota period, which
lasted for fourteen years, has been
chronicled in detail by Gillespie,
and represents the most fruitful
and effective period of Becker's
life, both as a composer and as a
"crusader" for modern music. During these years he established sufficient contacts in New York to arrange for performances of his
works and appearances there as a
speaker and minor celebrity.
Despite favorable reviews, he met
with mixed responses from the
New York establishment. He was
perceived as "preachy" and uncompromising, and probably, as at
Kidd-Key years before, lacking in
social polish. He was not inclined to
curry favor with patrons, and he
made it a practice to rebuke all critics, even when they praised his
work.
In late 1935, with Becker's appointment as Minnesota director of
the WPA Federal Music Project, his
efforts were redirected again toThe Cresset
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ward social and c1v1c causes, and
his activities on behalf of "ultramodernism" began to wane. He
had not lost faith in its principles,
but he recognized that the experimental movement he championed
had lost to the still-prevailing European models. He moved to the Chicago area in 1943 to teach at Barat
College in Lake Forest, and he
later taught at Chicago Musical
College from 1949 to 1953. Eventually, his health declined and he
slipped into oblivion.
In a letter to Riegger, Becker
wrote, "I am not too pleased with
my complete isolation in a desert of
musical stupidity, disloyalty, and
expediency." Although this statement dates from 1957, it could
have come from almost any period
of his life. Becker always resisted
the popular "Bohemian" notion of
the artist, but he clearly believed
the composer to be expressively
and intellectually set apart from society.
In an article of 1927 he proposed that manipulating sounds
"into logical and intelligible form
demands a labor and a sacrifice of
one's vitality that is impossible to
describe," and in another essay of
the same year he attacked the supposition that music is "a feminine
art created for the amusement of
the crowd." He spent most of his
life attempting to educate and improve "the crowd," and to elevate
his art and craft beyond simple
amusement. His mature modernist
style, in which dissonance is the
norm and consonance the exception, is abstract and distinctly unamusing. In his music, if not in his
life, he transcended his own provincialism.
The New York reviews of the recent concerts indicate that it is no
longer necessary to consider Becker
merely a regional artist, but rather
one of national stature. Perhaps it
is now acceptable for midwesterners to take pride in his work.
Cl
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The People in the Next Room
The people in the next room
sit as if their bones
would break at a glance, fragile
as the teacups they balance
in the amber light of late afternoon
that falls past the heavy dotted-swiss curtains.
They do not move or speak
as I go out and in on my rounds.
I have not spoken to them. I have many
things to do. I do them daily, moving
easily about the town.
But they are always there
in their parlor, in all weathers,
watching or waiting, as the sunstream
draws across the rosy dresden.
I mean to speak to them but do not
interrupt what seems to be a portrait
in progress .
I do not think they think of me.
They have something Americans
aren't supposed to have,
according to a Fitzgerald novel.
I will watch them
and maybe pray for them.
What shall I pray?
They ask for nothing.
They ask me for nothing.
They are like bells.
They move in quiet lines past
the cold hearth
where God waits in the ashes
yet they do not speak.
They sit in repose
as if they had found something.
In and out I go
on my rounds.
I imagine a sad songperhaps the Ave Maria floating
out from their closed room,
following me through the old streets.
But there is no song. No sounds,
save my shoes on the pavement,
and the sudden arc of pigeons
blurring the image of stone deities
guarding the entrance to a hushed and darkened place.

J. T. Ledbetter
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Review Essay

A New Voice
From Ireland
Jill Baumgaertner

The Killeen
By Mary Leland.
Atheneum. $12.95.

New

York:

In Ireland a killeen 1s a small
graveyard, usually at a crossroads,
but at any rate outside the walls of
the churchyard. It is reserved for
unbaptized infants.
In this first novel by Mary Leland, the killeen with its pitiful collection of collapsed graves and
white stones does not appear until
the final chapters. Early in this
story about revolution and its victims and survivors, however, one
realizes that the killeen most in the
author's mind is metaphorical-the
Ireland of the revolutionary 1930s.
The book is not narrowly political:
it does not possess an ideological
agenda. It is, however, political in
the broadest sense of the word; it is
concerned with individuals and
their allegiances and neutralities,
their insights and blindnesses, and
the political/religious realm's simul-

Jill Baumgaertner teaches English at
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taneous exaltation and victimization
of those who acquiesce in it.
The Killeen possesses biases on
neither side of the Irish question,
although it does reveal a sensitive
Catholic orientation. Mary Leland
also shows how every action of
every individual is both profoundly
religious and profoundly politicaleven when these actions are attempts by the individual to extricate him or herself from religion or
politics.
The book is divided into three
sections--each concentrating on
one of three characters whose lives
are inextricably entwined. The first
is Margaret, a naive and pretty girl
fresh from the country and newly
hired to work in a convent. Seduced in the convent gardens by
Earnan, a Republican in hiding,
she conceives and bears a son
whom she gives up to the care of
others when Earnan escapes to
America.
Margaret is innocent of politics,
and somewhat neutral about religion, although she does insist that
her child be baptized immediately
after he is born. What she feels
most profoundly is a connection
with the land she has left. One afternoon, reading aloud to Sister
Thomas Aquinas, she pauses a moment to reflect on her earlier country life.
"I could stand up there, sometimes I went up there just to be on
my own, and from the rocks there
I could see all the fields, all lumpy,
falling down away from me, and all
the little houses, not so little
perhaps, but they looked small because I was up so high. 'The little
wind-swept hamlet.' That makes
me think of it, the hill.''
Sr. Thomas turned to look at her
as she was speaking. "Good girl,"
she said softly. "Your eyes are
open. Let them be always open,
sometimes we can listen better with
our eyes than with our ears, Margaret. In this book, for instance,
Corkery . . . is showing us the
landscape we can recognize, often
because it is our own, and he is

asking us to listen to what it
says... .''
Margaret's world is lush with gardens and growing things. As she
polishes the windows , "all her
senses flared and through the heat
shone a smell of sustained
geramums, the smell of the
greenhouse before the summer's
tomatoes covered everything with
their aromatic dust." This is the
legacy she wishes to give her child,
Thomas-the connection with the
land-but her attempts to ensure
his future as a true country man
(the ideal of the Republicans) do
not work .

This book does not
possess an ideological
agenda; it is, however,
political in the broadest
sense of the word.
Margaret's story is juxtaposed
and intertwined with Julia's, the
Paris-educated, aristocratic young
widow of another revolutionary
who, on a hunger strike, starved to
death in a Dublin prison. Julia, too,
is innocent of political involvement
and only with her husband did her
life achieve any sense of purpose.
His ambitions were Ireland's, however, and after his death she resolves to leave Ireland with her
son-to keep him from following
the inevitable path to martyrdom
his father had embraced.
Of course, in so doing, she will
also be cutting the boy off from his
Irish roots-from the Irish language, from "Irish hymns at the
Latin Mass." But that is the price to
be paid for life, she believes, after
having watched her husband dievoluntarily-in a prison cell.
Before she leaves, she encourages Margaret to accept the offer
of marriage from a young man
The Cresset

about to move to England, and
helps her to see her son, Thomas,
for one last time. It is at this point
that Margaret arranges for her
brother, Michael, to take Thomas
back to her home in the country.
Julia thinks of her own escape
from Ireland as a kind of exchange. She will whisk her own son
away from his roots and their inevitable consequences, but she will
leave Margaret's child, Thomas, to
wrestle with his, to pay the price of
his inheritance.
So Margaret abandons Ireland,
as do Julia and her son. Left behind are Michael and Thomasand the final chapters of the book
are about what happens to the
child at the hands of Margaret's demented mother. Michael realizes he
must become father-protector to
the child, carrying him to the fields
with him and caring for him when
he is ill, but the child weakens and
eventually dies.
The most moving and beautiful
chapters of the book describe
Michael's vigil over the small coffin
in the garden shed, his burial of
the child in the killeen (he has no
baptismal certificate to prove that
the child was ever baptized and so
the priest will not allow the child to
be buried inside the walls of the
churchyard), and his quest for the
proper stone to mark the site of
the grave. Michael decides that in
spite of the land which he works
and loves, his family , his church,
and his country have left him with
nothing. He turns to face the sea
he has always turned his back on
before and soon he, too, leaves for
America.
So what is left? The pitiful
mother and a helpless sister (pointedly named Mary) back home. The
killeen. The land itself. The energy
and the promise have faded-emigrating to other lands with their
own dreams, or decaying quietly
outside the walls of the church,
which has unwittingly cut itself
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off from its own resurrection.
What is left the reader is a remarkable series of images-fragments that startle and define, that
act as poems to draw us into the
dream of the novel. When Sister
Thomas collapses for the final time
on the stairs of the convent, "all
[Margaret] could see were the skirts
lifting slightly as the sisters bent toward Sr. Thomas, the black-stockinged ankles, the polished shoes
with their square, inch-high heels,
all the clutter of sisterhood."
Later, as Margaret washes dishes
at Julia's house, "the goblets shone
in her hand, their tracery of fronds
like frost trapped in the crystal.
Mrs. Bourke sat at the long deal
table, the brown pottery tea-pot in

front of her and tea, as dark as a
bog pool, in her cup."
Michael returns to the grave with
his stone. "With his hand, [he] hollowed out the hump of grassy soil
and then, kneeling so that the
grave was like a bed between his
legs, he pressed the block of stone
onto it and pressed the earth back
against the edges of the stone."
Such images do not fade. They
are so strong they become a part of
the reader's own memory and history. This is the mark of great writing. Mary Leland's prose is rich
and lyrical, and she understands
the ambiguities inherent in human
action-particularly when political
and religious ideals become Inseparable.
~~

The White Cell Count Fear
At the base of our hill,
vandal lights shower the school.
My son walks his pneumonia
down the hall and stands
white in the window.
I watch him thin where
we have no drapes, say
"he's improving" to myself,
a peasant who has to trust
the syringe of strangers.
And I get ready to test
for fever, listen as his breath
of rasps inflates
the white cell count fear.
Right now, I think, he's going
to turn and call his question,
ask me by name nothing
like the reason for surveillance,
and I will stand to walk
my answer toward the light.

Gary Fincke
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"Near-Poorness"
Dot Nuechterlein
"You, D. Nuechterlein," screamed the bold type on the front of
the envelope, "have won TEN
MILLION DOLLARS!!"
Right, I thought, casually tossing
it on the growing heap of junk
mail. You, dear reader, know that I
wasn't particularly excited by that
message, because you also receive
more of those come-ons each
month than can be kept track of.
We have all seen the small print on
the inside that says the money is
ours "if your entry includes the
winning number." Sure.
It seems that everyone is into the
sweepstakes and giveaway business,
which makes me think it must be
pretty good business for somebody.
Medical plans and auto clubs must
also be rather lucrative, since those
are two more items that continually
fill up the mailbox and the trash
can.
Want to buy a magazine subscription? A dozen companies regularly tell of their "lowest rates anywhere," accompanied by promises
of cash and prizes if the order is
received by such-and-such a date.
Cheese, flowers, cars, greeting
cards, clothing, jewelry, office
supplies, and charitable donations
are some of the others that use
pitches like this.
No purchase is necessary, naturally, but still the odds of winning
anything are not favorable; someone has said that a person is nearly
as likely to be hit by a meteorite as
to win the Publisher's Clearinghouse big bonanza. So I seldom
succumb to the temptation to waste
postage in this way. And I never
buy lottery tickets or indulge m
other like forms of roulette.

It isn't that I wouldn't like to win
a few million bucks--even a couple
thou would be appreciated. As a
lifelong penny pincher with no savings and a formidable list of creditors I think it would be a nice
change to pay off my debts and try
another style of life for a while.
People-no doubt jealous peoplesay that big-time winners aren't really happy, but I could be persuaded to give it a try just to see if
they might not be proved wrong.
Of course I know exactly what
would happen. Before I even had
the chance to spread the news
around, my phone would ring and
Don or Max or another friend in
the Development office would be
suggesting ways to help me make
the most of this beautiful opportunity. Right after that I would throw
the biggest party anyone has ever
seen, inviting everyone I have ever
known; it would last for days and
everybody would remark on what a
fun time he had.

I have rarely made what
others would consider a
wise fiscal decision.
Then I would divvy up some of
the largesse with my kids and my
parents and probably half of the
people with sad tales who called
saying they needed a helping hand.
And probably immediately after
that I would learn that whatever
was left had already been conscripted by the IRS, leaving me
with my debts intact and my bank
account still flimsy, with nothing to
show for it all but memories of the
great social highlight of a lifetime.
I know that would happen, because I have rarely made what
others would consider a wise fiscal
decision, and chances are I would
repeat the lifelong pattern of giving away some of my resources and
having a good time with the rest of

it. I believe poverty is a terrible social ill, one that we should collectively try to solve, but living in what
might be called "near poorness" is
not so bad, once you get used to it.
And I am quite used to it.
Now don't take me wrong; I am
not complaining. We all make some
choices about how we wish to live
our lives and I am quite content
with mine. It's just that monetary
considerations do not rank all that
high in my scheme of values, and it
is fortunate I married someone
who doesn't have many · more financial anxieties than I do, or we
would have had big trouble long
ago .
Also it helps not to have been
blessed with good taste. I mean,
people with exquisite judgment
cannot possibly live in "near poorness" without going a bit crazy, because they must constantly notice
the discrepancy between what they
would like and what they can afford . (I have a couple of children
like this.) But we tasteless ones tend
to value our possessions in a more
or less functional way; to be honest
we don't even notice when someone is especially well dressed, or
has shelled out a bundle for some
object or accessory.
The theory is that if you pay a
lot for what you wear, for example,
it will last a long time and you can
get good use out of it forever . But
we "near poorness" people spend
as little as possible for clothes; we
buy several pieces for less than
what others pay for one, so we
have some variety; and we wear
our things forever anyway. Plus
when we get sick of cheapy stuff it
can be junked with a relatively
guilt-free conscience.
So I daydream like everyone else
about what I would do if I won
some fantastic prize someday, but it
will never happen, and then if it
did things wouldn't change much.
There's a bit of comfort in there,
#I
somewhere.
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